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Ever since African states gained their respective independences, regional 
integration has been at the highest realm of their goals. The states have since seen 
it as a solution to their slow growing economies and as a means of poverty 
reduction.1 
It has been a very slow but enormous progression on the part of Southern African 
countries since the establishment of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 
1910. These states developed and are still continuing to develop promising 
approaches to trade negotiations in both multilateral and regional economic 
negotiations 2 and agreements they have with the European Union (EU) such as the 
Southern African Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement (SADC 
EPA) and South Africa with the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA) it has with the EU. 
SACU took it upon itself to bring into existence a common external tariff but the 
TDCA has proved to not take into account the concerns of the other SACU members 
namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS).3 The promotion of 
trade is mainly boosted by developed countries trading with developed and least 
developed countries extensively than it is by developing and least developed 
countries trading with their respective counterparts.4 This means developing and 
LDCs do not become part of regional integration economic groupings to promote 
trade. 
This is one of the main reasons why the agreements that these states conclude 
with the EU should be concluded in a way that boosts trade without encroaching on 
other states for such to be attained.  
                                                          
1 Peter Draper, Durrel Halleson and Philip Alves ‘SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in 
Southern Africa’ From Spaghetti to Cannelloni? Trade Policy Report No. 15 available at 
http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002411/SACU_SAIIA_Jan2007.pdf. Accessed on 2nd September 
2013. 
2 Stephen R. Hurt, Donna Lee and Ulrike Lorenz-Carl ‘The Argumentative Dimension to the EU-Africa 
EPAs’ paper prepared for the IPEG Conference, September 2012, University of Birmingham. 
3 Dani Venter and  Ernst Neuland Regional Integration - Economic Partnership Agreements for 





1.2  BACKGROUND 
1.2.1 Southern African Customs Union (SACU)  
This is a customs union5 that came into existence in 1969 from the signing of 
the Customs Union Agreement between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland (BLNS) and became effective in 1970. It had emerged from and 
replaced its predecessor which had been established in 1910 by the Customs Union 
Agreement.6 Members of the five states that comprise SACU were in accord that in 
order to democratise SACU and thereby allow for the current needs of the SACU 
member states to be addressed more effectively, the 1969 agreement had to be 
renegotiated.7 SACU as it stands today, is the product of yet another agreement that 
was signed in 2002 and which was a subsequent replacement of the 1969 
agreement.8  
This initiative has been regarded as having discrepancies in policies, levels of 
development, political systems and administrative capacity.9 Many political and 
economic circumstances influenced the features of SACU, and South Africa 
accounting for the great majority of the economic factors that hold SACU together, 
assumed absolute discretion over external trade policy. 
South Africa having that much discretion brought no problems and for as long 
as the possible costs10 of the customs union were recognised and acknowledged, 





                                                          
5 A customs union is a union which allows regulations of commerce and separate tariffs to apply to a 
substantial part of the union member states’ trade with each other within their territories. GATT Article 
XXIV (2). 
6 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) History and Present Status, Department of International 
Relations & Cooperation Republic of South Africa, available at www.dfa.gov.za. Accessed on 16th 
September 2013.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Peter Draper et al op cit. 






1.2.2 Southern African Development Community (SADC)  
SADC is one of Africa’s several regional trade initiatives and it evolved from 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was 
formed in 1980 and mainly focused on barricading the Apartheid system that was 
prevailing in South Africa and therefore paid less to no mind in fostering regional 
trade agreements.11 In 1992, this initiative then became SADC post the signing of 
the SADC Treaty and that was when it started gearing towards expediting regional 
economic integration.12 It can also be safely concluded that when South Africa 
participated in 199413 the feasibility of SADC as an economic community was 
likewise enhanced. 
The SADC protocol sought to liberalize tariffs on products immediately and 
gradually but there were disagreements.14 
The SADC region was to establish a SADC Customs Union by 2010 pursuant 
to the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)15 but the 
region failed to meet that date and up to this day it has not been established. It is 
viewed that the CU will unlikely be formed in the near future.16 This CU was going to 
deal with negotiations of a common external tariff (CET) and its implementation 
thereof. 
1.2.3 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
The EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have 
replaced the Lomé trade regime which entailed non-reciprocal trade preferences with 
the EPAs. The EPAs are in direct relation with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement 
(CPA) and regional integration is as such a gateway to both agreements. The 
European Commission (EC) has for a long time regarded regional integration as the 
                                                          
11 Sophie Chauvin and Guillaume Gaulier ‘Prospects for Increasing Trade among SADC Countries’ 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) 2002 Annual Forum at 
Glenburn Lodge, Muldersdrift (Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies). Available at 
http://www.tips.org.za/files.pdf Accessed on 16 September 2013.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Fact Sheet on the interim Economic Partnership Agreements SADC GROUP 2009. Available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/fact_sheet_epa_sadc.pdf.   





main component for the development of ACP countries.17 Negotiations involving all 
the ACP countries began in 2002 and two years down the line they had grown to 
regional level.18  
The EC strove for trade deals with the ACP countries that were 
comprehensive and compatible with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules but 
because the ACP states had different interpretations of the development component, 
different degrees of lack of improved market access among other things, it was not 
easy for the EC to come up with ways it would align the objectives it had with the 
different circumstances of the ACP states.19 These differences had to be resolved 
and because the Contonou Agreement is a preferential agreement, members of the 
WTO criticised it for not coinciding with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).20 The EU subsequently found hope for a more WTO 
compatible agreement in the EPAs.  
These agreements seek to promote regional integration but the fact that the 
negotiations configurations do not correspond with the regional economic integration 
groupings, economic and trade ties that have been established over long periods of 
time are being shattered. 
There are also strong views that the regional integration process 
achievements that have been developed and nurtured with such potency can be 
destroyed by EPAs.21 Each of the ACP regions has negotiated and is still negotiating 
their individual EPAs with the EU. 
Due to the new regime of EPAs, the African region was along the way divided 
into four configurations concerning the negotiations on EPAs22 from the six individual 
                                                          
17 San Bilal, EPAs: fostering regional integration? PES Conference on Economic Partnership 
Agreements: Fostering Regional Integration and Development? Available at www.ecdpm.org 
accessed on 23rd September 2013. 
18 Mareike Meyn, Economic Partnership Agreements: A ‘historic step’ towards a ‘partnership of 
equals’? Working Paper 288 available at www.odi.org.uk accessed on 23rd September 2013. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Catherine Grant ‘Southern Africa and the European Union: the TDCA and SADC EPA’ Tralac Trade 
Brief 2006.  
21 Chiwandamira D P, A Review of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS) Between The 
European Union & SADC And The Implication for Small Scale Farmers, 2006. 





negotiation groupings the entire ACP members were divided into.23 SADC countries 
were further divided in that the Northern SADC members decided to be part of the 
Eastern and Southern African (ESA) EPA group because many of the countries 
belonged to multiple regional organisations and this left the other countries under the 
SADC EPA configuration.24 Those being Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania, however the study will focus on the SADC EPA 
as it  comprises of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. South Africa unlike 
the others entered into a bilateral agreement with the EU which is known as the 
TDCA. 
It can be mentioned in passing that products that come from the SADC EPA 
region receive duty-free and quota-free access into the EU market and have no 
obligation under that agreement to reciprocate to the EU whereas under the TDCA 
South Africa is bound to reciprocate and therefore grant EU products the same 
treatment granted to its products by the EU.  
SADC EPA is the agreement between the EU and the SADC countries 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) and excludes South Africa 
which has a bilateral agreement with the EU as mentioned earlier.25 
As members of SADC have observed SACU provisions it is crucial for that 
initiative that tariffs towards the EC emanating from the SACU members remain 
coherent.26 The EPA was initially anticipated to result in only one trade regime 
between SACU and the EC and this had emanated from the fact that the Cotonou 
Agreement was already in existence and in force for the BLNS countries and for 
South Africa there was the TDCA.27 The council of the EU made a decision to revise 
the TDCA so that a fairly substantial amount of tariffs would be aligned in the TDCA 
so as to be on par with the tariffs that were agreed and set out in the EU SADC 
interim EPA (IEPA) between the EU and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.28 
 
                                                          
23 Ulrike Lorenz Transformations on Whose Terms? Understanding the New EU-ACP Trade Relations 
from the Outside In No 40 2012. 
24 Ulrike Lorenz op cit 10. 
25 South Africa was however integrated in the agreement at a later stage. 
26 EPA Negotiations: Where do we stand? - SADC – available at www.acp-eu-trade.org accessed on 






1.2.4 Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
This agreement was signed between the EU and South Africa in 1999 as an 
agreement providing comprehensive cooperation between South Africa and the 
EU.29 The Southern Africa region has long been participating in regional integration 
and the 2002 SACU agreement brought about changes in that measures were taken 
to ensure that when dealing with third parties, SACU members negotiated a more 
efficient trade policy approach.30 South Africa having an agreement with the EU to 
the exclusion of the other SACU members defeats the purpose of the efficient trade 
policy in that the other SACU members end up having to conform to provisions they 
did not agree to and agreements to which they are not signatories. 
The TDCA binds its signatories to broaden their cooperation and is as such, 
inspired by the Cotonou agreement between the EU and the ACP countries.31 It 
established preferential trade arrangements between the two continents (Europe and 
Africa) and it gradually introduced a Free Trade Area (FTA)32 among its members. 
As was the vision of the EU to create WTO compliant agreements, the FTAs are 
created under Article XXIV33 and they are territories in which member states have 
signed a Free Trade Agreement in which they eliminate tariffs on imports originating 
from the member states yet subjecting such tariffs on goods imported from non-
members of that particular FTA. 
Although a common external tariff existed even before the 2002 SACU 
agreement, SACU members were during that time focused on negotiations on 
bilateral free trade arrangements with other countries and had little regard for the 
individual concerns of each other. 
The EU-SADC EPA is a single negotiated agreement and South Africa had 
only been an observer but joined later in 2007.34 South Africa is of the opinion that 
                                                          
29 Cooperation Between The European Union and South Africa, Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007-
2013 available at www.ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository accessed on the 27th September 
2013.  
30 Catherine Grant op cit. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/south_africa.Accessed on 15th September 2013. 
33 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
34 Sandrey, R. and Gill, T. 2013. ‘An assessment of the Trade and Development Cooperation 




rules of origin negotiations, tariff negotiations and other outstanding contentious 
issues are fundamental and must be addressed.35 An improved market access within 
the EU is what South Africa above what has already been agreed under the TDCA is 
looking for. The EU in taking account of South Africa’s request indicated that it 
requires reciprocal action from South Africa regarding products that are currently not 
included in the TDCA offer.36 It is important to mention that Rules of Origin (RoO) on 
other products and regional cumulation are still not resolved.37 
1.2.5 The Tripartite Agreement (COMESA, EAC and SADC) 
The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African 
Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) all 
agreed on establishing an FTA under the Tripartite Agreement in which they seek to 
enhance cooperation with their multilateral and or bilateral partners as well as to 
enhance inter-Regional Economic Community (REC) economic cooperation.38 
The same way as has been revealed through numerous studies that at the 
heart of regional integration in Africa the main problem is the overlapping 
membership in RECs which is resultant from members joining multiple regional trade 
agreements, this agreement brings about that same issue and it is appropriate to 
state that this continued intertwined membership has undermined regional 
integration as an important tool for Africa.  
Aside from multiplicity of obligations, the TFTA also shows high possibilities of 
bringing up substantial losses on the economic status of countries which will result 
from a wide-ranging trade liberalisation.39 Although this TFTA is not short of hurdles, 
it does promise economic gains too and a better solution to the multiplicity of 
obligations phenomenon that exists in RECs. However in order for it to indeed be the 
solution, the issues pertaining to rules of origin and different tariff liberalisation 
schedules must be addressed and resolved. 




38 Memorandum of Understanding On Inter Regional Cooperation and Integration Amongst Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Article 2. 
39 Jensen, H.G and Sandrey, R. 2013. ‘A new approach to a regional Free Trade Agreement in east 




1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It is said that the EU sought to implement the EPAs as a means of strengthening 
regionalism among the ACP countries.40 The creation of the EPAs may however 
have a different effect on the Southern Africa states than was envisaged.41 It is 
believed that there is a potential rift that may occur and therefore halt trade 
integration as opposed to accelerating it.42 After all, facilitation of trade is contingent 
upon the rate of success of movement of goods in cross-border trade. 
It is a fact that when it comes to implementing rules-based dispensations such as 
the trade agreements up for discussion in this dissertation, developing countries and 
least developed countries (LDCs) undergo severe capacity constraints due to these 
agreements being embodied in legal instruments which involve sovereign states and 
international organisations. 
Because of these legal obligations and the internal incorporation required from 
the member states challenges are likely to be faced by these members.43 Both 
SACU and the TDCA are rules-based and the limited consideration given to their 
legal and influential aspects is the one that converts them into stumbling blocks 
when it comes to how they affect other members.44 
SACU being a CU which has a CET and providing free movement of goods 
among its members on one hand and the TDCA being a bilateral agreement which is 
also considered to be an FTA on the other are somewhat different in their extent of 
integration.45  With these two already at odds with each other and the BLNS 
countries being de facto members of the TDCA due to the fact that the SACU 
protocol prohibits members from entering into agreements with third parties without 
the consent of other members46 and also because as members of SACU sharing a 
                                                          
40 Economic Partnerships Agreement in a nutshell, European Commission. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu accessed on 15th January 2014. 
41 Christopher Stevens, ‘The TDCA, EPAs and Southern African Regionalism’ in Talitha Bertelsmann-
Scott and Peter Draper ‘TDCA: Impacts, Lessons and Perspectives for EU-South and Southern 
African Relations’, SAIIA Trade Policy Report. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Gerhard Erasmus, TDCA: Impacts, Lessons and Perspectives for EU-South and Southern African 
Relations, Legal conundrum: SACU, the TDCA and EPAs SAIIA Trade Policy Report. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 




CET47 and thereby having TDCA provisions applicable to them for instance BLNS 
being forced to place tariff reductions on EU imports in accordance with the rate 
agreed in the TDCA by South Africa,48 hinders the integrity of the member states as 
partners in the SACU agreement.  
Claims have been made that simultaneous membership of an FTA and a CU is 
possible, however this can remain viable only for so long especially if the original CU 
members are involved in countless diverse configurations to the extent that the 
primary CU exists only so far as reference can only be made to it and not because it 
is still in operation.49 
1.3.1 Facilitation of market growth and integration 
This dissertation seeks to answer whether the TDCA and the SADC EPA contribute 
towards a growing market and integration within SACU. 
It examines- 
i. whether the objectives of the TDCA facilitate or hinder market growth and 
integration within SACU; 
ii. whether SACU can withstand the TDCA’s existence with SADC EPA in 
operation simultaneously; 
iii. Some of the benefits to be derived from the tripartite FTA; and 
iv. whether the TDCA and the SADC EPA can be harmonised still allowing 
SADC to be part of the TFTA. 
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. 
Chapter 1 comprises of the introduction and background to the study. It also 
gives out the research question and lays down the chapter outline. 
Chapter 2 examines the development and progression of market integration 
within the SACU/SADC region and looks at the objectives of the two. It goes further 
                                                          
47 Paul Kruger ‘The impact of new generation trade issues on EPAs. Available at www.tralac.org.  
48 Catherine Grant op cit. 




to examine the implementation and challenges encountered prior and post the TDCA 
by SACU/SADC members.  
Chapter 3 looks at the EU and Southern Africa region trade relationship. It 
focuses on the benefits and the pitfalls that are or may have been experienced by 
both SA and other SADC members as a result of the trade relationship between the 
two regions under both the TDCA and SADC EPA. It also delves into the proposed 
COMESA, EAC and SADC tripartite agreement focusing on how common external 
tariffs and the multiplicity of obligations by members have come to hinder upon the 
member states’ commitments and how these problems can be solved. 
Chapter 4 gives an analysis of whether and how the TDCA and SADC EPA 
can be harmonised as the ultimate solution to the potential disintegration of SACU. 
Chapter 5 concludes and gives recommendations on how the issues 
pertaining to the existence and enforcement of these Agreements may be addressed 


















CHAPTER 2    
REGIONAL ECONOMIC (MARKET) INTEGRATION WITHIN SACU AND SADC 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines regional economic (market) integration taking place 
within SACU and SADC by outlining its rationale and examining how important it is 
for the region to pursue this mechanism considering the developments that will be 
achieved to help grow the member states’ economies. It discusses the history of the 
mechanism and analyses the objectives the CU has to boost integration. It outlines 
trade facilitation within the region and addresses the CU’s vision taking into account 
the relations it has with third parties and member states’ participation when striving 
for development. 
It looks at how the RoO affect the trade integration agenda and further 
examines the RISDP, discusses the progress that has been made and challenges 
that have to be overcome if the implementation of the CU and SADC objectives are 
to be achieved. 
The chapter argues that member states need to work towards developing the 
region and not prioritising their states individually. There is also need for reform in 
the way that the SACU Agreement provisions are complied with. There should be 
strict provisions that will ensure that there are consequences to be faced if states fail 
to comply with the provisions. Trade integration ought to be accompanied by highly 
determined efforts in order to assist in diversifying the capacity of the production that 
goes on in the region. 
2.2 REGIONAL (MARKET) INTEGRATION 
The reduction of tariffs and quotas together with the removal of other barriers 
which Schiff and Winters50 say are known as deep integration and the introduction of 
trade blocks in which first world countries enter into agreements with developing 
countries and become equals for example the trade agreements the EU has with 
SADC countries: agreements known as North-South agreements. 
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Southern Africa has a goal as an entire region to advance its economic 
integration by creating a fully integrated and internationally competitive region with 
the principal objective of reducing poverty. It seeks to achieve this through its SADC 
Agenda.51 
In most studies a distinction is not made between regional economic (market) 
integration and regional integration. A brief distinction will be highlighted between the 
two.  
Regional economic (market) integration is on one hand explained as when 
different forms of perception between national economies are suppressed. Under 
this implication the member states’ aim is to merge their distinct markets into one 
large market.52 In order for the markets to be merged into one, a linear progression 
of integration53 acts as a pathway, this is to say that an FTA, CU, Common Market, 
complete economic integration and complete political integration all have to be 
undergone. 
Regional integration on the other hand is said to have taken place when a 
group of states belonging to the same region volunteer to have access to each 
other’s markets and therein establish mechanisms that minimise conflicts and 
maximise internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of 
their interaction.54  
The Southern Africa region has for many years attempted regional market 
integration with no success due to the extremely slow growing economies of the 
Southern African countries so it decided to focus on regional integration as a whole 
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2.2.1 Rationale for Economic (market) Integration 
SACU and SADC member states have strived for the implementation of 
regional economic integration because majority of these countries having very small 
domestic markets that are said to restrict economic growth56, regional integration will 
foster an increase in their economic growth. The economies of scale in the 
production and distribution of goods57 end up insufficient due to the member 
countries’ small domestic markets.  
It is therefore important for this region to practice this mechanism because 
developments such as agricultural production and economic diversification will be 
achieved and trade will spearhead economic growth when regional and international 
markets are easily within reach.58 
When tariffs are reduced and a country’s economy has imposed fewer 
barriers to market entry with lower transaction costs59 prospects of investment and 
investment itself will grow, thereby creating jobs and eradicating poverty which will in 
turn allow these states to be internationally competitive.60 
2.2.2 History of economic (market) integration 
It has been mentioned that SADCC was not established for market integration 
and that the situation changed when it became SADC and the member states then 
implemented a broad development mandate. The SADC Treaty does not lay out a 
detailed plan for integration but the plan was laid out in the RISDP.  
The plan was set to run as thus; an FTA was to be established by 2008 then 
come 2010 a CU and the CU has not been achieved yet while the FTA was 
completed in 2012. It also aims to have a common market in 2015, a monetary union 
in 2016 and a single currency in 2018.61 Considering that in 2013 only one entity in 
the plan has been achieved, SADC was overly ambitious. It is comprised of 
developing countries and mostly LDCs and South Africa being the only power house 
                                                          










with Mauritius and Botswana joining it as the three among the top five most 
competitive countries in the Sub-Saharan region62 was obviously a sign that there 
was no possibility for the community to achieve its goals within such a short period of 
time.    
2.2.3 SACU 
 The present day SACU dates back to 1910 when Britain and South Africa 
decided to incorporate the High Commission Territories into South Africa.63 This first 
agreement entailed a refined regional integration. It is said to have lasted for almost 
60 years however experiencing contentious operating procedures that strained it.64  
South Africa adopted an import substitution programme which led to SACU 
experiencing high protective barriers in 1925 and then from 1930 there was 
intensified pressure for the renegotiation of the CU’s revenue-sharing formula65 as it 
was seeking to promote its industrial growth. The 1969 SACU agreement was then 
formed and was believed to be satisfactory as the markets of the BLS countries 
(Namibia having not acceded to it yet) were open for South African consumer 
products and through this the BLS countries would come to realise that there was 
need for a new agreement.66 
 The South African Board of Tariffs and Industry was the body that was making 
recommendations on external trade policies and the BLS countries had no problems 
with that.67 The years progressed and the other SACU members began to see the 
flaws in the agreement in granting sole decision making regarding tariffs to South 
Africa.68 
Considering that this is the oldest functioning CU in the world, SACU’s 
integration has evolved immensely having a Common External Tariff (CET) and 
having some of its members cooperating in the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and 
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taking steps to advance the economy integrations of its member states.69 The SACU 
Tariff Board and national bodies were to manage this as provided for under the 2002 
SACU Agreement but it is said that the bodies have not been established yet.70 
SACU had not been functioning in a manner that was appeasing to its 
member states in the 1980s but the situation took a turn when the members set forth 
negotiations to reconstitute it.71 There was an agreement made in which South Africa 
attained captive markets which were suitable for its goods that were no threat to the 
international market as they were internationally uncompetitive and the BLNS states 
would in return receive a disproportionate share of the revenue pool.72 
The 1969 SACU agreement was renegotiated because South Africa felt that it 
could no longer afford to compensate the BLNS countries the revenue sharing 
payments since its residual share of the common revenue pool had been declining 
significantly and therefore placing burden on the country.73 
Gibb states that it may appear as though the BLNS countries were collecting 
fairly enough revenue pool compared to how little they were contributing to the CU’s 
Gross National Profit (GNP) when in actuality South Africa’s goods were benefiting 
substantially from the CU.74 
The revenue-sharing formula that was used by the CU amongst its member 
states did not satisfy the BLNS countries as compensation for the adverse 
consequences that were brought about by being part of the CU.75 
There is also the issue of the EPAs and these negotiations are said to have 
caused a split between the BLS countries and South Africa and Namibia as a result 
of the members not being able to reach consensus on the negotiations.76 This is in 
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addition to the global financial crisis faced by BLNS and how much the countries 
depend on the CU’s revenue pool for the good amount of each of their income.77  
There are numerous problems facing SACU, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) favours production-led regional economic integration as opposed to 
market-led regional economic integration and under the production-led regional 
economic integration, the CU and tariff arrangements are not of much importance 
and the CU is broken down to an FTA.78 This is done so as to construct a network 
infrastructure which is an aspect of integration. Production-led regional economic 
integration is integration in which the focus is on the development of regional public 
goods while market-led economic regional integration occurs through tariff 
liberalisation.79 
2.2.4 SACU objectives 
The member states met on the 12 April 2013 where they gave out a strategic 
direction which has been planned to increase SACU’s potential as a CU which will 
yield a deeper economic integration within Southern Africa. SACU is spearheading 
towards promoting the industrialisation of each of its member states.80 A 
comprehensive programme emphasising the development of a regional industrial 
development policy81 was initiated to see the promotion of industrialisation through. 
SACU will be working on projects such as joined cross border projects which are 
targeted at increasing industrial development cooperation as well as the creation and 
strengthening of cross-border value chains.82 
The 2002 SACU agreement provides for the development of common 
industrial policy, a policy of unfair trade practices among other things. Importantly 
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also is that it provides for a Common Negotiating Mechanism in relation to trade 
negotiations with third parties.83 
2.2.5 Trade facilitation 
SACU has been gearing towards a development of trade partnerships 
strategies to facilitate trade and to help achieve this it made a proposal to introduce 
the Preferred Trade Programme as part of the first phase in developing those 
strategies.84 It developed this programme so that it could boost legitimate trade by 
forwarding benefits to traders as a form of encouragement for them to engage in 
mutual trade with SACU.85  
As another means to help implement and facilitate trade the SACU council 
approved a proposal made by the World Bank to assist the CU by conducting a 
Trade and Transport Facilitation Assessment on behalf of and for SACU.86 The 
assessment is mainly aimed at discovering the key barriers to trade within the 
region. The council is also looking to propose the use of rail transport for facilitation 
of trade and that this should be included in the CU’s transport programme.87 
2.2.6 New Vision  
SACU is on a mission, and its new vision is to be an economic community 
with an unbiased and sustainable development and it endeavours to commit its 
existence to the welfare of its people for a common future.88 
2.2.7 Third Party trade relations 
 Article 3189 allows member states to engage in trade with other parties who 
are not members of the CU even if it is under a preferential agreement90 however the 
members are neither permitted to form preferential trade agreements with third 
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parties nor revise in any way the agreements that are already in existence without 
the rest of the member states’ approval.91 
2.2.8 Member States’ Participation 
Member states have the authority to have their own competition policies and 
the Agreement urges for cooperation between the members when they enforce 
competition laws and regulations.92 
Conflict should rightfully arise if South Africa is to be the only major benefactor 
from SACU, more especially when in respect of the industrial policy that SACU 
began discussing in 2012 which discussions focused on making sure that the value 
made in the CU turned into a practical industrial development of the member states93 
ends up being an industrial development of South Africa. Indeed the BLNS member 
states are benefiting from the CU but South Africa is doing so at the expense of the 
other members’ industrial development.94  
Then Trade Industry Minister, Dorcas Makgato-Malesu of Botswana:  
‘A plant which was exporting vehicles to the SACU region closed after South 
Africa challenged a RoO provision that entitled the plant to the duty and quota free 
export.’95 
Article 296 states that the Agreement aims to create transparent and 
democratic institutions for the member states’ trade benefits to be guaranteed97 and 
to promote both fair competition98 and open up opportunities that will increase 
investment in the Common Customs Area.99 SACU also pushes for the 
enhancement of its member states’ competitiveness and economic development100 
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bearing in mind to boost not only the regional economies of its member states but 
their global ones as well through the development of their trade and investment.101  
South Africa is using its economic stance wrongfully against Botswana which 
is also a small economy but unlike the other member states depends on South Africa 
less since it has its own purchasing power.102  
It is therefore crucial that when it comes to policies in which other member 
states have the adequate capacity to produce, they should receive benefits which 
amount to the contribution they bring to the industrialisation policy.103 SACU seems 
to be working more towards a South Africa agenda instead of a SACU common 
industrialisation policy in this respect and it violates the provisions of the Agreement 
in the process.104 It should benefit deserving member states under this sector as it is 
benefiting them under revenue and large market access. 
2.2.9 Unfair Trade Practices 
 The Agreement authorises the council of ministers to advance policies and 
instruments in which they address any unfair trade practices that occur between 
member states and they ought to do this on the appropriate advice of the CU’s 
Commission.105 
2.3 SADC 
Regional cooperation and integration comprises of four theories which are the 
economic or market integration theory, regional cooperation, development 
integration (which is said to include market integration) and regional integration.106 Of 
these theories SADC has adopted the market integration theory via SACU, a CU 
which Tom Ostergaard says ‘applies to only one of the stages in the envisaged 
evolution from a free trade area to an economic union’ hence ‘it is more appropriate 
to speak of market integration’ as a whole since it captures the other theories.107  
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SADC is governed by the SADC Treaty which came up with the Trade 
Protocol that was signed in 1996 and became enforceable in 2000. This Protocol 
was established for trade liberalisation.108 However the fact that it took a number of 
years after signing before it was enforceable indicates that the region still had a long 
way to go before it was ready to engage in trade liberalisation. 
SADC has a set of key principles and values that guide the regional 
integration agenda and it refers to them as the Common Agenda. These principles 
are outlined in Article 5109 and consist of the policies and strategies of SADC.  
Among many, the SADC common agenda seeks to achieve development and 
equitable economic growth and socio-economic development aimed at alleviating 
poverty through regional integration110 as well as ensuring that the extermination of 
poverty is addressed in all SADC activities and programmes.111 It also seeks to 
assist member states to be interdependent and self-reliant so as to promote self-
sustaining development.112 
2.3.1 Rules of origin 
The SADC Trade Protocol has laid down common rules which ought to be 
used when member states determine where goods originate in order to discover if 
they are entitled to receive preferential tariff treatment.113 Annex 1 of this protocol 
realises that in order for goods to be accepted as eligible for preferential treatment 
when they are traded among SADC member states, they will have to originate from 
member states.114  
The justification of RoO is said to be their preventative ability of trade 
deflection, which is not achieved easily due to globalisation and the fact that goods 
go through many production stages before the final product can be completed.115 
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These rules are defined as a set of criteria used to distinguish goods 
produced within the SADC member states which should therefore be given 
preferential tariff treatment and those that have been produced outside the SADC 
region and therefore are subject to full import duties.116 Since it is not as clear as one 
would expect to determine whether a product indeed originates from the particular 
country from which it was imported yet this is what one would assume, the rules 
have been made to entail comprehensive and very precise criteria which will be used 
in establishing the exact origin of that particular product.117 
The precise criterion that is used to determine the origin of the goods is laid 
out in Annex I118 and it states a product as originating from the SADC region if it has 
been wholly produced in the region or if it is produced in its entirety from components 
that originate from the region119 as per the origin criterion. Goods can also be 
produced in a member state but with utilisation of components from a non SADC 
member state and still be regarded as originating from the region only if such 
components were to a certain degree subjected to some kind of process in at least 
one of the member states.120 When the production of an object is only confined to a 
single stage, the origin of that particular product can be easily established. 
However if any work was conducted in relation to a product and that work 
does not affect the nature of a product or it only alters it in a way that it still maintains 
its natural state and purpose, the specific work done on it will not render it as not 
originating from the region.121 
2.3.2 Rationale 
The SADC RoO used to be unrestrictive by international standard and 
followed after the COMESA RoO. It is mentioned that this ensured that since some 
of the SADC member states were part of COMESA and therefore taking part in the 
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COMESA trade integration agenda, the rules of the two regimes were consistent with 
each other.122 
2.3.3 Problem of SADC RoO 
SADC’s adoption of the strict RoO has also been problematic because they 
have a relatively huge impact not only on the level of SADC intra-regional trade but 
on its trade with other states globally.123 SADC states benefit from the RoO only in 
so far as the conditions of the production of goods which are to be regarded as 
originating from the involved member states go. Critics argue that the existing RoO 
should be simplified while their counters maintain that RoO should be allowed to 
serve their purpose in protecting import-competing domestic industries since they 
are instruments of industrial policy.124 
The majority of SADC countries possess fragile customs administrations and 
this notion makes it even more challenging for the states to have the capacity to 
maintain the levels of trade high, through enforcing the RoO.125 
South African producers were encouraging and arguing for the RoO to be 
stricter so that they could boost industrialisation and the capacity of the other 
members with more fragile customs administration made the states’ capacity 
questionable as to whether those states would be able to prevent non-originating 
goods from claiming preferential treatment eligibility.126  
2.3.4 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
 This is an approach which SADC procured for direction in integration and it 
became formal in 2003. It is through it that SADC member states have developed 
instruments to push toward deeper economic cooperation and integration.127 It also 
provides SADC entities with a comprehensive long term implementation agenda.128 
SADC has the ability to make amendments on its objectives by including new ones 
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or removing the existing ones since the RISDP has no legally binding effect.129 It 
serves the purpose of making it possible to conduct an assessment of what 
challenges the region is facing as it progresses as well as its achievements.  
2.3.5 Rationale for RISDP 
 As it is a bearer of goals and challenges, implementations and mechanism 
that are to be dealt with and taken in moving forward, it is intended to address those 
aspects as they face the SADC cooperation and integration. It ought to achieve this 
by aligning SADC’s priorities and strategies which will assist in achieving deeper 
regional integration.130  
2.4 IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN SACU AND SADC 
The SADC region as a whole is said to have become more open despite the 
fact that trade flow is not high among the SADC members.131 In advancing 
integration in both SACU and SADC, trade integration ought to be accompanied by 
highly determined efforts meant to diversify the capacity of the production that goes 
on in the region.132 The member states can do this if other open regional markets 
present more opportunities and if the members ensure that they share those fairly.133 
SACU would have to move from an organisation that is kept intact by a CET and a 
revenue sharing formula to an institution that will assist in pushing towards deeper 
integration134 if it was to achieve this. 
SACU aims to support customs cooperation and trade facilitation initiatives by 
ensuring that the monitoring and implementation capacity for trade facilitation 
programmes is enhanced and that the initiatives influence best practices as well as 
current bilateral and national initiatives.135 The CU has also made it its mission to 
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improve border efficiencies, trade partnerships and legislation under the Customs 
Development Programme.  
The DTI stated that it seeks to ensure that SACU is an engine that makes it 
possible for deeper integration in SADC and that along the process it involves the 
world as a unified trading bloc.136 The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite FTA 
negotiations will help extend integration and this will be achieved through SADC 
consolidation of the FTA. 
2.4.1 Trade Facilitation 
 SACU has adopted five customs initiatives to help spearhead trade 
competitiveness and among these is the Single Administrative Document form which 
is said to be introduced as a common customs declaration.137 The CU’s Common 
Revenue Pool that SACU has in place allows member states to pay their extra duties 
to it so that it can be shared according to the formula.138 
As another way of improving the trade environment within its members and 
the CU, SACU has trade facilitation as a vital element on its mandate. This notion 
aims to optimise proficient levels of government control in the different member 
states and it seeks to develop a consistent and transparent environment under which 
international trade transactions will be conducted in a manner that makes the 
movement of goods across borders easier.139 
All the members of SACU are also members of the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO) and the WCO Capacity Building Directorate signed an 
agreement with SACU to provide technical and strategic support with the design and 
implementation of new initiatives.140 The region’s Heads of Customs approved that 
all the projects that are underway the SACU-WCO Customs Development 
                                                          
136 ‘Market Access, African Regional Integration’ op cit. 
137 Namibian African Ambassadors and High Commissioners Monthly Meeting – Address by the 
Executive Secretary Ms Tswelopele Moremi, 2007 available at www.sacu.int. Accessed on 21st 
October 2013. 
138 Ibid. 





Programme should continue and that the programme would help promote trade 
facilitation in the region.141 
2.4.2 Progress   
Within its mandate and following the SADC FTA, SADC is striving for a SADC 
CU and this may well be very beneficial as even more states within one region would 
have the opportunity to progress their trade plans as movement of goods would be 
easier within an enlarged area.142  
The formation of this SADC CU does however pose challenges because in 
order for that to be achieved the states are going to have to agree to maintain a 
single CET and this will be a very complicated and demanding process because 
SADC has 11 different tariff policies within it and these would all have to be joined 
into a uniform tariff regime.143 
2.4.3 Challenges 
SACU views its primary mandate as to push forward the implementation of 
the 2002 agreement144 in efforts to deepen regional integration and in relation to the 
SADC CU, SACU has a vision to position itself on the proposed SADC CU.145 It is 
worth noting that the challenges that SACU is facing stem from how the CU 
implements the SACU agreement. 
It faces one of its rooted challenges in the fact that SACU members are also 
members of SADC and since the two regimes are different they have different 
policies which have to be harmonised. There is a range of challenges that are facing 
SACU and each is fundamental to a certain degree and in its own right for SACU to 
overcome it to help maintain the existence of the CU.146 However at the core there 
                                                          
141 Ibid. 
142 Southern African Development Community, Towards a Common Future available at 
www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/customs-union/. Accessed on 15th October 2013. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Tswelopele Moremi op.cit. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Peter Draper and Memory Dube, Scoping the Future of SACU-a hundred years on, South African 





are two issues, the reform of the highly contested revenue sharing formula147 and the 
EPA negotiations with the EU.148   
SADC set its ambitious goals for economic integration but uneven progress 
has been made towards the achievements of its goals with its FTA completing its 
final tariff phase down in 2012,149 this has automatically moved the efforts to 
establish and complete a customs union, its common market, a monetary union and 
a single currency with no feasibility at least not in the very near future. This region 
has many obstacles to overcome. It is facing constraints of an economic nature, 
those that are political and some being of a legal nature. 
The economic constraints are brought about by the fact that its member states 
have economies that differ remarkably. These states have various trading 
capabilities and because of member states’ dependency on natural resources and 
with the majority depending on aid, the different states’ trading phases end up not 
aligning with each other.150  
Furthermore, having a huge gap between the different states’ financial 
regimes and more so having the majority of the states being LDCs, just a few being 
developing states and only one qualifying under the developed category, the few 
dominant states in the region are not encouraged to support integration.151 The 
overall result of the states having weaker legal environments makes the more 
financial-dominant states unwilling to push hard for the region’s integration. 
There is a different level of political commitment among the members and this 
has taken the members in the direction of an inauspicious ratification of protocols 
which leads to inconsistencies in areas such as trade.152 SADC lacks legal 
mechanisms which would strengthen its enforcement capacities in order to assist it 
in alleviating associated risks that link the member states’ economic fates.153  
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Another issue is the trade-related problem under which SADC’s integration 
strategy that seeks to create an FTA and eventually establish a monetary union 
seems to be a long way due to member states’ uneven and slow progression in their 
tariff reduction targets.154 With South Africa having the magnitude of dominance that 
it has over the other member states, its counterparts hesitate in furthering integration 
into a regional body with such prominent economic and political unevenness.  
Market integration has not been a successful game for developing countries 
and Africa has been no exception to that fact, to the exclusion of South Africa of 
course. Southern African countries’ economies are small and the majority of these 
countries export primary goods to the developed world turning back to import 
manufactured goods from those developed countries, this is counter to competition 
between these developing countries and renders it almost impossible for 
comparative advantage.  
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory suggests that a country does not 
have to be best at producing something in order for it to gain from trade,155 for 
example countries A and B will still stand to benefit from trading with each other even 
if A is better than B at producing every product. If A is very good at producing wine 
and only slightly good at producing cheese and B is not as good as A in producing 
either, B should still invest resources as well even if it is not as efficient as A.  
 Comparative advantage must therefore exist if gains are to be acquired from 
market integration.156 It is important to note that market integration is likely to divert 
trade rather than create it and even under such circumstances,157 South Africa will 
be the chief beneficiary since it is the main player in the SADC region.  
The production capacities of both SADC and SACU are relatively weak and it 
has been established that they also add little value in the production chain. Because 
many countries in the SADC region have cumbersome regulatory framework, trade 
and integration increase at a slow rate.158 Lowering or removing tariff barriers 
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completely is no doubt beneficial however it does not inevitably increase trade and 
these countries need to have strong productive capacities if they are to have 
competitive production in their territories.159  
The institutional capacity of the member states is inadequate and weak and 
has limited the implementation of projects such as the Bank Group portfolio. This has 
supressed the efforts of regional integration.160 
Regional integration as a form of development for the SACU and SADC 
experiences further problems because of states being members in multiple 
organisations yet they have underdeveloped economies, institutional weaknesses to 
mention a few.161 The fact that the region lacks strong institutions has made it prone 
to low speed of the region’s economic cooperation.162 
When institutions are weak, the region does not attain any powers that would 
be used to enforce collective decisions and easily implementable treaty 
provisions.163 All the states involved in the SADC region have to consent in decision 
making and this may be one of the best methods but it inevitably brings about 
problems in that the rate at which the region’s economic cooperation progresses is 
dictated by the states in the region that move at the slowest pace since all member 
states have to agree to the final decision.164  
Regional integration has also been limited by the existence of supra-
nationality which renders it not easy to enforce policies and principles that different 
states mutually agree on as a result of lacking centrally co-ordinated institutional 
mechanisms.165 
Undermining national sovereignty is one of the causes of the slow progression 
and challenges that face integration within SACU and the SADC region. It can be 
seen from earlier years that when SADC first came into existence, it was focused on 
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integration through project co-ordination166 and it was fixed on maintaining main 
barriers to intra-regional trade and neither tariffs nor non-tariff barriers but it instead 
hoped for underdeveloped production structures.167 Successful regional integration 
has thus been hindered by states’ fear of losing their respective national 
sovereignties.  
It is important to state that on the issue of sovereignty, it is not easy to speak 
on how the BLS states are sovereign when 90% of the region’s GDP is generated by 
South Africa and Lesotho and Swaziland’s national budgets being comprehensively 
subsidised by South Africa through the revenue pool.168  
Scholars have been very sceptical about the incorporation of regional 
agreements in various protocols and this has been because when states have to 
decide on them, the decisions and agreements ought to be recognised at the 
national level.169  
To the significantly broad list of problems that face regional integration and 
therefore market integration in SADC and within SACU is the trade relationship 
between SADC and the EU. South Africa already has a trade relationship with the 
EU which is recognised through the TDCA and the rest of the SADC members are 
still in negotiations with the EU under the EPAs. Member states which are not part of 
the SADC EPA have joined trade relationships with the EU under other EPAs. The 
different agreements will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
SADC has not been any different from the rest of Africa in experiencing 
hardships when it comes to progressive regional integration. The SACU states just 
like their fellow African non SACU states have joined multiple institutions which are 
not part of SADC and this has proved to be a stumbling block for market integration 
to progress. 
Moreover the proliferation of trading arrangements has cluttered up trade with 
biased attention being placed on the said nationality of the goods. Under FTAs RoO 
multiply regardless of how extensive their codifications are and this multiplicity is 
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triggered by the fact that member states have their own external tariffs which differ 
from each other’s.170 
 The absence of penalty policies or mechanisms in the governing instruments 
which should be imposed on member states following their failure to fulfil their 
undertakings is another aspect that holds back progression.171  
In order for the member states to comply with the SADC Protocol and the 
SACU Agreement, the legal and institutional infrastructure ought to be realised both 
at the national and regional level.172 This would be a major step in assuring that 
member states remain accountable for their conduct or none thereof. 
A detailed situational analysis of the industrial and economic landscape of 
SACU member states is to be conducted and a proposal is said to follow which will 
pitch different policy options and strategic interventions.173  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 SADC is gearing for increased trade liberalisation as a tool for it to achieve 
deeper regional integration which will subsequently open a wider gate for global 
integration when the region has grown. It has the RISDP as its engine to assist it by 
providing the region’s integration approach and strategy as it progresses towards its 
goal of deeper integration. Its achievement of one of its major goals to introduce its 
own FTA may have been achieved four to five years post the target date but it is 
nevertheless comforting that there has been progress however slow it has been. 
SACU as the longest existing CU has indeed progressed positively for its 
member states. It continues to be a moving force of the economies of its member 
states though it is reasonably arguable that both SACU and SADC have a long way 
to go in terms of how their mechanisms and policies are implemented if at all. Both 
entities have provisions that cater for implementation of policies but they fall short of 
monitoring and ensuring that their member states indeed implement their obligations. 
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There is a flaw in SACU regarding the competition policy which has been 
provided for in Article 40 of the Agreement, the Botswana and South Africa industrial 
policy related situation mentioned earlier in particular as reference. The said 
provision has been included but has neither been adopted nor implemented. The 
lack of availability of sanctions on member states for their violation of the provisions 
contributes in halting the growth and deepening of integration within the regions and 
globally as well since member states are aware that no negative results will befall 
them if they do not comply with some of the provisions. Steps have to be taken to 
ensure that there is harmony between the member states’ customs policies and 





















TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The EU’s trade and development vision for the African continent dates as far 
back as the 1957 European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty in the hopes of 
economic and social development of those countries.174 This relationship was initially 
mostly comprised of Europe’s French African dependencies but grew to open up for 
other countries due to the WTO rules which are enforced more strictly.175 The rules 
do not support discriminatory policies unless the situation under which discriminatory 
treatment occurs is recognised under the exceptions.176 
This chapter looks at the genesis of the EU and Africa trade relationship and 
its progression over the years through the Rome Treaty, Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement. 
 It also lays down the rules in relation to trade in respect of developing 
countries and LDCs under GATT. It shows the treatment the EU has decided to 
grant to developing countries and LDCs and the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
under GATT/WTO to qualify for such preferential treatment. 
It goes on to discuss the African RECs, their objectives and also highlights the 
problems that are faced by African countries in regional integration. It examines the 
EAC in brief, details COMESA’s progress and looks at how the merging of the three 
RECs is the solution to the problems faced by the concerned countries. 
It also examines the benefits of the SADC EPA and details how South Africa 
individually and other SACU members collectively stand to gain and lose under the 
TDCA and the SADC EPA. 
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3.2 GATT and WTO 
 The 1947 GATT had no provisions that allowed developed countries to afford 
developing countries special treatment and in an effort to recognise the need for 
these countries’ participation in global trade, considering as well that the countries 
were in much need of development in their economic spheres, Part IV which is a 
section that focuses on the trade and development aspect of these countries hence 
special treatment, was incorporated in the 1965 text.177 The WTO also sought to 
increase the significance of the development of the trading system by having the 
special treatment reflected through the Enabling Clause in 1979.178 
3.2.1 Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
 This is a set of measures under which developed countries consider and pay 
attention to the vulnerabilities that developing and LDCs are exposed to in 
international trade.179 The parties to the Marrakesh agreement realised that their 
trade relations and economic undertakings being governed under a single regime, 
ought to be carried out in a manner that geared towards sustainable development 
that would expand production and trade of goods ensuring improved standard of 
living and that the achievement of the views would remain consistent with each of 
their needs and concerns.180 The members recognised that developing countries and 
LDCs also had to share in the growth of international trade with the needs of their 
developing economies and that positive efforts were needed for this.181 
 The WTO Agreement was then adopted as an engine that would guide 
international trade relationships.  
3.2.2 Origin of SDT 
 Global trade exposed that in view of trade and development, it was 
questionable whether developing countries had the desirability of liberalising border 
measures at the same pace as developed countries and it was evident that during 
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the Uruguay Round Agreement negotiations, there was a decline in the stance of this 
approach in the majority of the developing countries’ governments.182 Then a 
number of SDT provisions on border measures and subsidies foresaw developing 
countries taking after the developed ones although at a much slower pace and finally 
other SDT provisions that support developing and LDCs were agreed on.183  
3.2.3 SDT in the GATT 
 Whenever developing countries required for things such as the application of 
non-tariff barriers they had to justify why that was sought and it had to be in terms of 
the standard GATT principles.184 Decolonisation and the growth of development 
economics made it possible for development oriented GATT provisions to be 
included and among the other forms of SDT, Part IV was adopted185 and added as 
the Enabling Clause.186 
The WTO Agreement has within it three types of SDT and those are 
concerned with technical assistance,187 market access and market protection (trade 
preferences).188 
SDT is the description of the preferential provisions that are contained in 
GATT and are applicable to groups of the WTO members, namely developing 
countries and LDCs.189 
The Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle is the core principle of the WTO 
which obliges members to grant any advantage regarding tariffs and any charges in 
relation to goods to all members and non WTO members as long as there is trade 
exchange.190 
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3.2.4 The Enabling Clause 
 The disregard of the MFN principle is justified by this clause. It allows 
developed countries to grant differential and more favourable treatment to 
developing countries and it also caters for aspects that deal with reciprocity and fuller 
participation of developing countries.191 The amendments that were made through 
Part IV in GATT take into consideration the special economic needs of developing 
countries and assert the principle of non-reciprocity which allows developed 
countries to overlook reciprocal conduct from developing and LDCs when they have 
reduced or eliminated tariffs and restrictions for the developing countries.192 
 It was because of the MFN issue that parties to GATT decided on the 
adoption of Article I waiver for the GSP which allowed developed countries members 
to afford more favourable tariff treatment to the products that originated from 
developing countries without granting same to their respective developed countries 
members for a period of ten years.193 When the Enabling Clause was adopted in 
1979, it became the passage through which preferential treatment could be accorded 
to developing countries as a means of facilitating their developmental, financial and 
trade needs while not expecting them to make concessions that are inconsistent with 
such needs.194 
3.2.5 Conditions attached to benefit from trade preferences 
 In order for WTO members to benefit under the preferential treatment 
scheme, there are requirements that each member ought to satisfy and these are 
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3.3 THE EU AND AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT 
The EU has seen Africa’s trade evolve from when the territories were just 
colonies to when they gained their independence and were no longer states that 
could be in trade relationships only when they were at the receiving end but that they 
would evolve and their participation would gradually increase. 
3.3.1 European Economic Community (EEC) 
The now EC and then EEC has taken steps to help the ACP countries expand 
their trade developments by granting the countries preferential treatment under a 
sequence of treaties with each treaty bringing new developments since the 
Community’s creation.196 It was formed when the Berlin Conference divided Africa 
into different colonies and Great Britain and France gained control over the majority 
of African territories. When France realised how important to its domestic market its 
colonies were, it put in place policies that would be gateways to the Yaoundé and 
Lomé treaties.197 
3.3.2 The Rome Treaty 
 It was under this treaty that the EC granted the African territories that were 
colonies of France, Italy and Belgium the Associated State status. The Treaty was 
signed so that the EC would form a common market198 mainly concerned with 
expanding trade and establishing a free trade zone between its founders and the 
Associates states and it achieved this by allowing for the removal of all tariffs199 on 
goods that were traded among its members. Favourable treatment was extended to 
the colonies that had been granted the Associated State status in which goods 
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imported and originating from them would subsequently not be subjected to customs 
duties and such existing customs duties were to be abolished progressively.200 
3.3.3 Yaoundé 
The Yaoundé convention (Yaoundé I) came into existence when the 
European African colonies gained their independence and asked for the trade 
relationship to continue on a level that was now consistent with their new status of 
independence.201 The EC and a number of former French colonies signed the 
convention which remained effective for five years until its expiration.  
The Yaoundé II then replaced Yaoundé I with a few amendments to the 
provisions regarding trade.202 The Associated States wanted to maintain a CET that 
would protect their exports from non-Associated States but some EC members 
fostered the removal of the CET provision as they found it discriminating against 
other developing countries and the EC decided to establish the GSP with no 
expectations of reciprocity from developing countries.203 
3.3.4 Lomé   
 The Lomé conventions were a generation of four conventions from the first 
one, Lomé I to the last one, Lomé IV.204 The evolution of these conventions 
increased trade as a passage of development and unlike the Yaoundé II it was 
through the Lomé that the non-reciprocity system was adopted, greater EC market 
access by the largely increased ACP members was given and special treatment and 
protocol regulating some products were granted to them.205 The EC also decided to 
redefine the RoO.206 
3.3.5 Cotonou 
 It has been learnt that the ACP states enjoyed non-reciprocal tariff 
preferences for goods they exported to the EU market under the Lomé conventions 
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that preceded the CPA.207 The negotiations of this Agreement replaced the 
preferential trade regime with FTAs between the EU and the ACP states.208 The 
CPA introduced the EPAs which would treat all members equally by progressively 
liberalising trade in a reciprocal manner and thereby being consistent with the WTO 
rules209 with exceptions that are recognised with regard to the different countries’ 
development stance.210 
It is said to be the most comprehensive partnership agreement that the EU 
has formed with developing countries.211 This agreement brought other changes to 
the trade relationship between the EU and ACP countries.  
The Agreement is comprised of a trade component and a non-trade 
component, and under the non-trade component it recognises development aid and 
political sector as other mechanisms necessary in fostering economic growth and 
integration.212 The trade component entails arrangements that were current during 
the Agreement’s establishment together with future regional agreements that were 
on the members’ agenda.213 
This Agreement aims at the reduction and eradication of poverty, which once 
achieved will lead to the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy.214 The CPA places emphasis on regional cooperation and integration with 
part of its main objectives as liberalising trade between the EU and ACP region via 
Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPA).215 
It is through this Agreement that the reciprocity concept in respect of goods 
being granted preferential market access was finally introduced in the trade 
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relationship between the EU and the ACP countries following its adoption in the 
Lomé convention.216 
3.4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
3.4.1 AEC 
African countries as one under the African Union (AU) decided to have an 
African Economic Community (AEC) by 2027. It has a number of objectives it seeks 
to attain enlisted in the treaty.217 
 (i) The objectives of the AEC  
The AEC’s mission is to promote among other things the economic 
development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic 
self-reliance218 as well as fostering the coordination and harmonisation of policies 
among existing and future economic communities.219 As a way of attaining its 
objectives, the members have undertaken to ensure that they strengthen the RECs 
that already exist and that new ones which are not in existence yet are 
established.220  
The members’ aim when the agreement was concluded was to harmonise 
and co-ordinate policies among RECs221 and as members with different trade 
regimes, they seek to liberalise African intra-regional trade through abolition of 
customs duties and non-tariff barriers among members states as a way of 
establishing a FTA on every level of all RECs.222 In order to liberalise trade the 
adoption of a common trade policy vis-à-vis third parties223 is sought after and the 
establishment and maintenance of both a CET224 and a common market.225 
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The RECs that this work will focus on are the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 
3.4.2 EAC 
The EAC was formed in 1917 between Kenya and Uganda.226 Then 
Tanganyika and now Tanzania joined later in 1927 and the CU went through 
numerous stages to an EA Co-operation.227 Integration of this community began 
when the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite for East 
African Co-operation was signed in 1993 post failure of a regional bloc in 1977.228 
This REC has had a rapid progressive integration agenda. It has a CU treaty that 
was signed in 2004 and implemented gradually since 2005.229  It has since had other 
countries join in. 
A treaty was signed in 1999 which would establish the EAC and it came into 
force in 2000.230 In its evolving forms the EAC is said to be the oldest regional 
economic organisation in the world.231 It is the first one in Africa to establish a 
common market which became effective in 2010.232 
3.4.3 COMESA 
 The genesis of COMESA can be traced from the mid-1960s when the 
economic co-operation received motivation from the positive mood of pan-African 
solidarity and collective self-reliance which emerged from a shared destiny.233 
Proposals that were made to establish a mechanism to promote sub-regional 
economic integration were taken into consideration by the Eastern and Southern 
Africa states under the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).234 
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 During the 1978 period, then Trade, Finance and Planning Ministers 
recommended for a sub-regional economic community to be created and within this 
there was to be a sub-regional preferential trade area which would gradually develop 
into a common market over ten years.235 It was to this end that the Treaty 
establishing the PTA was adopted. Heads of State and Governments then went on 
to sign the Treaty in 1981 and it became enforceable the following year.236 
(i) Objectives  
The ESA PTA was established so that it would allow for greater social and 
economic co-operation and ultimately form an EC. The 1981 PTA Treaty foresaw its 
revolution into a common market and the Treaty that established COMESA was then 
signed in 1993 and further ratified in 1994.237 
 It is important to highlight that when the PTA was established and further 
transformed into COMESA, the processes took place in conformity with the 
objectives of the Lagos Plan Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As economic integration evolved, it was through 
this process that the continent’s RECs would constitute building blocks from which 
the AEC would ultimately be created.238 
 COMESA aims to promote a more balanced and harmonious development of 
its production structures in order to sustain the growth and development of its 
members.239 The common market also seeks to ensure that it attains co-operation in 
promoting stability among its member states for the enhancement of economic 
development and the strengthening of relations between the common market and 
the rest of the world.240 Furthermore it strives to push towards establishing and 
ensuring that there is progress and realisation of the AEC’s objectives.241 
COMESA is also aiming to eventually establish a Common Monetary Area as 
a step in the direction of deepening regional integration and this is of particular 
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importance to the EU in respect of the EPA negotiations it has going with the African 
countries.  
SADC and COMESA collectively face obstacles that will make it difficult for 
them to deepen economic integration and these include the restrictive RoO, NTBs, 
missing complementarities in intra-regional trade and overlapping membership to 
mention a few.242 
(ii) COMESA launch 
In 2009 the CU was launched and key principles and rules were endorsed to 
establish it. These included the internal free trade area, the region’s relations with 
third countries and the application of the CET, the conclusion of the CU among other 
things.243 
The CU catered for the different needs of its member states and it is said that it 
has policy space, flexibility and periodic reviews of its CET, market access and also 
that it has these principles to enable states to be members of the CU and still be able 
to take into account their key national issues.244 
(iii) Progress within COMESA 
COMESA has been successful as a community in enhancing regional 
integration through trade facilitation. It performed strongly within itself as a region 
and this has shown that bringing it together with the EAC and SADC the members 
would be able to tackle global challenges.245 The community has had a profitable 
and sustainable trade which has allowed for good planning as it is based on a 
regime of rules under the integration program.246 The infrastructure and trade 
facilitation programs within the region have helped reduce things such as transaction 
costs in relation to trade by consolidating the region’s internal market.247 
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(iv) Remedies for revenue losses 
The community realised the possibility of its short term revenue losses by its 
members due to the application of the CET and set up a COMESA Fund which will 
cater for the losses.248 The said losses are expected to arise from the community’s 
trade liberalisation programmes, however in the long term the application of the CET 
is said to increase revenues from import structures.249 
3.5 COMESA-EAC-SADC TRIPARTITE 
 The Tripartite was formed in 2006 to help the involved RECs harmonise 
programmes and policies between them and to strengthen their ability in advancing 
their establishment of the AEC250 so the Heads of State and government of 
COMESA, EAC and SADC agreed that the Tripartite initiative was a decisive step in 
order to achieve the African vision of indeed establishing the AEC.251 
3.5.1 Overlapping membership in RECs 
 There are numerous regional arrangements that exist in the Eastern and 
Southern Africa region of which most countries are members and as such have 
joined more than one arrangement.252 This issue of overlapping memberships 
between different regional arrangements has proved and still continues to exert 
costs on the member states.  
States tend to have their negotiating capacity and resources hard-pressed as 
they try to fulfil their obligations under the different arrangements.253 The 
arrangements come with their differing RoO and each arrangement has its own 
administrative rules and mechanisms and the states suffer these costs due to the 
complex RoO that one administration may have or even more than one to which a 
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state as a member may have.254 The states also have to pay as well as maintain 
membership fees which are said to be expensive.255 
 When these states are members of numerous regional arrangements, their 
objectives end up conflicting against each other and this has contributed to both the 
slow or lack of progress that is experienced in many areas of the region.256 
 The issue of overlapping membership was very high on the list of priorities 
that the community set to address and resolve257 and the community was expected 
to adopt a roadmap within three years that would guide them in forming the Tripartite 
CU and Common Market.258 Negotiating Principles (NP) and a Declaration that 
Launched the FTA Negotiations and all other FTA draft documents were prepared 
and formally submitted but the priorities appeared to have changed when the 
Declaration and the NPs were adopted to guide the process.259  
Among the numerous priority changes is the fact that member states are 
going to be allowed to conduct negotiations as individual states or as blocks. It is 
also stated that the Agreement is going to allow different trading arrangements 
applied within the three configurations to co-exist.260  
The community is now going to deal with tariff liberalisation, RoO, customs 
procedures, NTBs261 inter alia first and the NPs highlight that the exchange of tariff 
concessions will take place between member states that do not have any preferential 
arrangements between them.262 It should be remembered that the only states that 
can have the exchange of tariff concessions are member states that belong to the 
three RECs that make up the TFTA and to say this denotes that only a few countries 
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in the entire region and with membership to the Agreement will extend tariff offers to 
each other263 for instance Kenya and Namibia or Egypt and South Africa.264  
3.5.2 TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE AREA (TFTA) 
 The Member States of the three RECs established a FTA.265 Under the TFTA 
Agreement the objectives are inter alia the promotion of social economic 
development within the region and the alleviation of poverty, hunger and disease. 
The community undertook to improve the location factors for sustainable generation 
of local, regional and foreign investment and of trade opportunities in order to 
achieve such promotion.266 In addition, it is to ensure the consolidation of the three 
RECs’ internal markets and to facilitate duty and quota-free trade within the common 
market taking into account the RoO.267 
Among its general objectives, the TFTA seeks to establish a CU and a 
common market which will be so established through the creation of a bigger single 
internal market and therefore allow free movement of goods and services among 
other things.268 The community aims to expedite the regional and continental 
integration process by alleviating the multiple membership issue that exists in the 
region.269 
The Agreement has also made for other objectives which have been provided 
for specifically. 
It is said to eliminate tariffs and all trade barriers to trade in goods, liberalise 
trade in services and facilitate the movement of those goods and services across the 
borders270 while harmonising measures that facilitate trade and customs 
procedures.271 It is also going to create and maintain a framework that will be a guide 
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in implementing and administering the TFTA, CU and the common market272 
together with cooperation in other trade-related areas.273 
 The WTO’s core principle of non-discrimination, the MFN is also observed 
under this Agreement274 and it applies to all kinds of charges imposed on or in 
connection with any commodities that are transferred internationally as well as their 
payments.275 
A Tripartite Committee on Trade and Customs which will review the FTA 
status, makes appropriate recommendations on a regular basis276 and foresees that 
matters relating to the initiation of policy analysis on issues that affect the FTA has 
been established.277 The TFTA has incorporated within its text the elimination of 
NTBs as they have proved to be a huge impediment to intra-regional trade 
expanding and the members have put a Web-based NTB Monitoring Mechanism in 
place in order to succeed.278 
          (i) Advantages of the TFTA 
It is seen as an opportunity that will simplify the requirements of the RoO 
which are often hidden protection measures creating measures that take the identity 
of tariffs and thereby affect prices of domestic inputs.279 As would be expected, 
African states are no different from other states in that they also have different 
regulations, procedures and policies from each other which usually support domestic 
goods and services over imported ones. Implementation of this FTA helps in 
eliminating NTBs.280 
There are also drawbacks envisaged under the TFTA.  
Firstly, for a vast majority of the SADC countries, the revenue they get from 
customs is a representation of much of their governments’ source of revenue, having 
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a FTA will bring financial costs due to their reliance on import duties. To rectify this, 
revenue policies that will compensate for the loss will have to be implemented.281 In 
addition, there is political tension among numerous SADC countries and this fact 
slows down the process of integration.282 Furthermore, there are countries which 
have larger and more diversified economies and there might be need for 
compensatory payments to those that are still on their long way to having larger and 
diversified economies like their counterparts283 as is the case within SACU.  
In light of Zambia being an actively participating member of the COMESA and 
SADC, and having the vision to continue, the country is in a good position when it 
comes to its regional trade policy.284 This means that when it exports goods, they are 
not subjected to any duties when the exports are destined to either or both FTAs.285 
The implementation of the CUs of COMESA and SADC, the TFTA as well as the 
COMESA monetary union that is being discussed will pose negative results towards 
its membership in both FTAs.286 
SADC is gearing towards forming a CU, and in considering the RoO, logic 
does not favour even the possibility of imposing a CET on all non-COMESA 
states.287 The three RECs reached consensus on the harmonisation of their different 
CETs and this will resolve the problem of overlapping memberships thereby 
strengthening the development of the AEC.288 
3.5.3 Rules of Origin  
There are already RoO in existence and according to the acquis289 based 
tariff offers, new RoO will have to be created. This is going to bring about more 
complications with regard to the overlapping membership issue.290 The SADC RoO 
are already viewed as a stumbling block and therefore one of the major courses of 
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the low trade levels within the region291 and so the RoO should be discussed as 
these concerns will undermine the RECs instead of consolidating them. 
3.5.4 Common External Tariff 
COMESA and EAC already have a harmonised CET and this eliminates the 
option of member states in these CUs having to choose to remain with one over the 
other as the single CET moves the two RECs into a single CU.292 If the FTA between 
these two regions and SADC is to succeed, all the RECs are going to have to 
rationalise their tariff structures and develop common criteria in respect of products 
that are considered sensitive.293 COMESA and EAC have already agreed that they 
will form CET duty rates with similar applied duties on the goods that will be agreed 
upon.294  
SADC being a FTA and having its members as participants in multiple 
regional trade Agreements, had not rationalised its CET in 2011295 when the 
Tripartite FTA negotiations were first launched296 and to overcome that problem it 
needed to.297 It is important to mention that because of SACU, which is a CU within 
SADC the fact that it has a complex tariff structure is going to make the process 
more complicated. 
In relation to developing common criteria for those products that are 
considered to be sensitive, deeper integration is likely to be undermined because the 
process of describing what goods are regarded as sensitive products will not be easy 
seeing that the majority of SADC and COMESA countries lack clarity on what goods 
qualify under that category.298 
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3.6 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)  
The EPAs came about from negotiations that took place between the EU and 
the ACP countries. They were launched in September 2002 in Belgium and the 
agreement came into force in 2008.299  
The negotiations of these Agreements were structured in two phases and the 
EC negotiated with all the ACP states in the first phase and with each of the groups 
in which the regions were later divided in the second phase.300 
The economic and trade cooperation undertook to eliminate poverty and 
promote sustainable development by fostering gradual integration of its member 
states into the world economy301 and to enable the ACP countries full participation in 
international trade as its ultimate objective.302 As a way of taking cognisance to the 
needs of developing and LDCs,303 the cooperation shall conform to WTO rules as 
well as address the effects of preference erosion in compliance with multilateral 
commitments.304 
This cooperation is to build on ACP states’ regional integration initiatives and 
it must be emphasised that both cooperation that supports regional cooperation and 
integration and that which supports economic and trade cooperation will be 
reinforced.305 
Efforts to build a single trade regime within the SADC region and between the 
region and the EU are complicated. There is going to be a lock in on trade relations 
with the EU which will have negative effects on the diversification of the trade 
relations the region has with other major economies globally due to the MFN 
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clause.306 Furthermore, the capacity for development and structural change within 
the region appears to be limited.307 
In addition the reduction of import duty revenue that will result from tariffs 
being reduced is going to impair the ability of numerous governments to supply 
public goods to their citizens and this will in turn limit their ability to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MGD) within the region.308 
3.6.1 Benefits of the EPAs 
In general terms these Agreements are going to increase the competitiveness 
of the SADC economies and improve the way regional exporters perform in trade. 
When the EU removes its remaining tariffs, the RECs in the region will have broader 
opportunities in exporting their products.309 Among the benefits that the EPAs will 
bring is the emergence of economies of scale when the regional markets extend 
beyond their different national borders.310 It is also expected that when the African 
states have formed their EPAs with the EU, there is going to be trade liberalisation 
that will foster sustainable policy making and encourage investors, especially foreign 
investors into the SADC region.311 
3.6.2 SADC EPA 
There was a problem within the region to bring together all SADC member 
states to form one group under which all states would negotiate the EPAs.312 SADC 




                                                          
306 Status on the disadvantages for South Africa regarding Member Countries of SACU and the EU 
with Agreements within the Framework of the Economic Partnership Agreement. International 
Relations & Cooperation. Available at www.dfa.gov.za.  
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Stefan Szepesi and Sanoussi Bilal, ‘EPA Impact Studies : SADC and the regional coherence’ 
2003. 
310 Ibid. 
311 African Trade Policy Centre EPA Negotiations: African Countries Continental Review op cit. 
312 Erik Grunke The Economic Partnership Agreements between SADC and EC Regional Integration 





3.6.3 Regional Configuration 
South Africa joined the EPA negotiations though it concluded a free trade 
agreement with the EU in 2000 which came into force in 2004.314 SADC members 
acknowledged that their memberships overlapped with other regional arrangements 
which more often than not differ in integration and trade programmes to those of their 
counterparts who would be negotiating the EPAs as well315 and SADC had itself 
taken a stance that there would be implications on the negotiations which would 
likely be brought about by the TDCA.316  
The EC decided it was best if each country became a member of only one trading 
arrangement with it.317 It was in this regard that members had to choose which 
grouping they would negotiate under. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland decided to fall under the SADC EPA group while the other 
SADC member states chose to participate under the ESA, EAC and CEMAC 
groupings.318   
Because member states could not agree on trade related matters in respect of 
both goods and services319 and the EU taking almost nine months to answer the 
negotiation framework proposal made by SADC, there was slow progress in the 
negotiations.320 Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique ended up agreeing 
to an Interim EPA with the EU in November 2007 and Namibia followed suit in 
December the same year.321 Despite the backlash they received from other SACU 
members, the states went on to sign the IEPA in 2009 to the exclusion of Namibia 
and the first round of EPA negotiations between SADC and the EC was held in 
2010.322 
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The EU is to be granted the same preference that will be granted to other 
parties should they establish a trade Agreement with the SADC EPA states and this 
causes a reduction in the policy space of the members but the EU holds firm that it 
serves to guard against discrimination.323 
3.6.5 (i) SA under SADC EPA (Gains) 
By joining the SADC EPA South Africa would be broadening its agenda on 
regional trade. South Africa has also back loaded its tariff reduction commitments in 
the TDCA in order to prepare for their phasing in.324 Since the transition period 
ended in 2012 for South Africa in respect of the TDCA, and that of the other SACU 
members under the SADC EPAs will end in 2020 to 2023 for the members, if South 
Africa was to switch to the SADC EPA it would bargain from the Agreement for a 
much longer transition period.325 
The EU is building growing economic relationships by signing free-trade 
agreements with many countries including Japan, the United States and others while 
at the same time its economic ties with Russia, China and Central Asia are 
diversifying.326 These emerging economic ties make it possible for the EU to have 
opportunities in South Africa’s regional context and this ensures that the SA-EU 
relationship remains relevant and will therefore enhance benefits to both SA and the 
EU.327 
(ii) SA under SADC EPA (Pitfalls) 
 South Africa faces many challenges within the regional context under this 
Agreement.   
The TDCA would have to be aligned with the SADC EPA and if this happened 
it would result in it no longer being of any relevance, therefore squashing out the 
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bilateral trade between it and the EU.328 The EU is a world class market which no 
country with developing prospects would pass an opportunity no matter how small to 
have access with advantages to its markets and choose instead to go with the SADC 
EPA under which it would have to compete with other members for the EU market. 
Indeed the competition would not be stiff but the fact that the EU would still be able 
to accommodate all the member states’ markets under the same agreement with the 
same treatment is what would discourage South Africa.329 
Another disadvantage that would befall South Africa if it was to drop out of the 
TDCA and go with the SADC EPA is that there would definitely be need for the 
defining of the RoO in a manner that would make the implementation of FTAs 
ultimately difficult.330 This would mean the other members’ economies would be 
destroyed since the majority if not all of them, depend on South Africa for trade and 
development and since they are not at a level where they can have internationally 
competitive markets. 
 South Africa is restricted from concluding other FTAs with chief trading 
countries that are not part of the EU and those would be the ones who are said to 
have a share of world merchandise trade that exceeds one per cent.331 The country’s 
ability to conclude agreements with countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China 
would have been constrained332 and it would not have been possible for the 
formation of BRICS on South Africa’s part.  These are emerging markets with which 
trade is guaranteed to develop the country’s economy.333 
 Furthermore, South Africa is not going to be granted the same preferential 
access that the EU has granted to the other members to its markets and this is due 
to South Africa’s growing trade deficit.334 
 When it comes to agricultural products that are exported to the EU, especially 
beneficiated products such as wine and sugar, the EU claims to have given South 
Africa a lopsided advantage in recent times and this is said to have become a 
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sticking point in the on-going SADC EPA negotiations in the context of the EU-South 
Africa bilateral trade provisions that are already in existence.335   
(iii) SA under the TDCA (Pitfalls) 
It is important to mention that the South African minister of Trade and Industry 
Mr Davies said in terms of the TDCA, access of South African agricultural products 
was not receiving satisfactory treatment and that the EPA negotiations would 
improve such access.336 The EU remains South Africa’s largest trading partner and 
investor, conversely this dropped considerably due to the EU still struggling following 
the 2008 to 2009 global financial crisis and this resulted in the demand for South 
Africa’s products by the EU falling while South Africa’s need for EU imports grew 
rapidly.337 
(iv) SACU members under the TDCA (Pitfalls) 
Because the members are in a CU, the implication is that all trade between 
them is duty free and therefore these countries have a CET with the rest of the 
countries globally.338 The TDCA therefore technically binds the other SACU 
members to the same import duty rates that South Africa agreed to in the 
Agreement. This undermines their sovereignties as independent states as they are 
bound by provisions they did not agree to. 
(v) SACU members under the SADC EPA (Gains) 
 The EU is going to grant SACU members, to the exclusion of South Africa, 
duty-free and quota-free access in the European market.339 The implementation of 
the SADC EPA is of relative importance to Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland as 
failure of such implementation would expose them and thereby cause their trade with 
the EU to revert to the much stricter GSP.340  
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If this was to happen, Botswana and Namibia would lose their preferential 
access to the EU market for tactical export products such as fruit while Swaziland 
which is big on the production of sugar341 would find itself out of the European sugar 
arrangement and thereby pass on striking sugar prices in the EU market.342 This 
situation would hit the economies of these countries in a very unfortunate way. 
For Lesotho, the SADC EPA is of utmost importance because as a LDC if this 
Agreement’s implementation failed, the country would qualify for trade with the EU 
under the EBA Agreement and there is more for it to benefit under the SADC EPA in 
comparison to EBA. 
As a country that majors in clothes manufacturing, it is highly dependent on 
the favourable RoO for its export on clothing and it is going to benefit more under the 
SADC EPA in comparison to the EBA since the RoO under the latter would be 
stricter than they would be under the former.343 
3.6.6 General drawbacks of EPAs 
South Africa pushed for contentious provisions to be addressed in a 
satisfactory manner in the Interim EPA (IEPA) and for SACU to carry on pushing for 
a common tariff offer to the EC so that SACU’s CET could be preserved as this is the 
essential foundation for a CU. States are going to have too many different 
obligations to the EU under the TDCA and SADC EPA and this will cause 
foreclosure on the harmonisation of policies within SACU.344 Moreover there is a 
possibility for the CET to be hit badly by the MFN provision and this has the potential 
to impede long term economic development in the region.345 
Some of the positives that the EPAs will have on SADC economies and their 
integration as well as on the other African groups in general have been stated. It is 
also notable that there will be effects on some parts of the economies that will be 
severely negative. 









There are high chances that the producers who compete on imports at the 
local level will be unfavourably affected by the increased competition that EU 
companies have because of the potential they have to exploit economies of scale 
and therefore end up dumping their exports in SADC markets.346 Furthermore, a 
short term set back could occur where there is significant job loss and de-
industrialisation from small and medium sized firms being vulnerable due to them not 
being able to access advanced technologies and exploit the economies of scale.347 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The EC has assisted the ACP countries expand their trade developments by 
granting them preferential treatment through the treaties from the genesis of the two 
continents’ trade relationship to the present day. 
The COMESA and EAC regions have been more successful in their growth. 
COMESA in particular has done well by catering for its member states’ short term 
revenue losses by ensuring that there are remedies such as the long term 
application of its CET increasing such revenue.   
These SADC countries will benefit best from regional economic integration but 
they have conducted the negotiations process in a manner that is counter to this 
being their priority. The states seem to be more focused on pursuing their national 
interests more than improving on their integration as a region. 
The tripartite agreement between the three regions is indeed what will help 
the SADC region improve its market integration. Regional and continental integration 
processes will also be improved by alleviating the multiple membership issue that 
exists in the region, which is the core problem that renders member states incapable 




                                                          






ANALYSIS OF THE HARMONISATION OF THE TDCA AND SADC EPA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
When the ACP countries became signatories to the Lomé Convention under 
which they were not compelled to reciprocate trade concessions to the EU, South 
Africa was initially denied membership on the basis of its economy being at a stage 
where the EU regarded it as a non-qualifier for non-reciprocal treatment.348 It was 
however allowed to join at a later stage following renewed negotiations although the 
terms offered gave the country minimal benefits.349 
The Lomé Convention expired in 2000,350 the TDCA was signed prior to that 
in 1999. It partially came into force in 2000 and was fully implemented in 2004351 and 
the Agreement is said to be supplemented by the Cotonou Agreement; the Science 
and Technology Agreement; the Fisheries Agreement and the Wine and Spirits 
Agreement.352 The economic partnership was fully implemented and developed into 
a FTA in 2012.353  
This chapter will be dealing with the trade chapter of the TDCA. It will discuss 
the impacts the TDCA has on SACU members and how its objectives have hindered 
market access for SACU members. It looks at the contentious issues within the 
EPAs and how the EU and SADC EPA region have tried to solve them. The chapter 
also examines the SADC EPA and its progress. 
Furthermore it reveals the relations between the TDCA and the SADC EPA 
and analyses whether SACU can withstand the co-existence of the two Agreements. 
It also details the implications of SACU vis-à-vis SADC EPA and those of the two 
Agreements on the SACU CET. 
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Then following the discussion on repercussions that are faced by the 
SACU/SADC states if they fail to conclude the SADC EPA, it displays the way 
forward and concludes that the harmonisation of the two Agreements is somewhat 
on the blurry end as harmonising the two would place South Africa on the losing end. 
4.2 OVERVIEW OF THE TDCA 
 This bilateral agreement covers trade relations, economic cooperation, 
development cooperation and numerous other fields such as socio-cultural 
cooperation and political dialogue.354 
 The two parties to the Agreement each had different liberalisation periods. 
The EU had ten years while South Africa had 12 years to fully implement this 
Agreement and the EU was to liberalise a slightly higher percentage of goods it 
imports from South Africa than South Africa had to on the ones it imports from the 
EU.355 There is an asymmetrical trade liberalisation relationship between the EU and 
the BLNS states and it is said that the EU-SA TDCA grants the EU effective free 
access to the markets of the other SACU members but those members do not 
receive reciprocal access to the markets of the EU356 and this illustrates how 
effective the RoO are.  
Since these rules are used as a form of establishing the economic nationality 
of goods to determine if such goods qualify for trade preferences,357 SA being the 
driving force within SACU is somewhat of a disadvantage to the other members. It 
would seem as though when it comes to EU goods into SACU via the TDCA, RoO 
depend solely on the geographic location from which they are being shipped, as in 
this instance they would be EU exports coming from SA into SACU countries thereby 
enjoying the CU privileges and this results in trade deflection358 whereas goods from 
these member countries do not enjoy same via the TDCA, as the EU ensures that it 
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gives concessionary access to its market to the intended recipient country359 which is 
SA under this agreement. 
4.2.1 TDCA objectives  
The Agreement aims to inter alia support the efforts that South Africa takes 
and with them consolidate the economic and social foundations of its transition 
process.360 It furthermore seeks to promote regional cooperation and economic 
integration in the Southern Africa region361 while also contributing to the harmonious 
and sustainable economic and social development of the region.362 In addition the 
Agreement wishes to increase the expansion and reciprocal liberalisation of mutual 
trade in goods, services and capital.363 
South Africa’s economy was closed during the apartheid and this Agreement 
is among the numerous factors that eventually opened up the economy.364 The 
country’s assets and investments have the potential to be of improved quality if there 
are various goods imported and if they are of a good quality as opposed to the 
domestically produced goods.365 South African firms may experience an increased 
competition when trading with different members of the EU and that may help 
stimulate more efficient domestic production.366  
Moreover, because the EU nations are developed, South Africa will benefit 
from processes that accompany increased trade with more developed nations as 
well as obtain new ideas from those partners which may be of significant help within 
SACU on how to make implementation of policies successful.367 The parties involved 
are looking to encourage the smooth and gradual integration of South Africa into the 
world economy368 and this has been successful thus far.  
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The two parties are at extensively different phases of development and South 
Africa having the capacity to trade with the EU and have the EU as its largest trading 
partner although there had been a growing trade deficit with the EU in the recent 
years369, makes it of interest to other international market economies and therefore 
the country has high chances of being a place of interest in terms of things such as 
foreign investments.370 This is also encouraged by the Agreement in stating that the 
EU will support and promote investment in both South Africa and the Southern Africa 
region through appropriate instruments.371  
The EU has also undertaken to develop and diversify trade between the 
parties and to improve the competitiveness of the country’s production on domestic, 
regional and international markets.372 If the EU and South Africa succeed in carrying 
out the Agreement’s initiative, South Africa will make huge gains in investment and 
this may well seal the possibility of the country engaging in integration through the 
SADC course.373 As South Africa will be dealing with power countries, being 
recognised as one of them post all the investment gains may encourage loss of 
interest on its part in assisting its neighbours develop as can be inferred from South 
Africa having previously used its economic stance wrongfully against the smaller 
economies.374 
4.2.2 The role of South Africa and the TDCA 
It was previously mentioned that South Africa was included in the EPA 
negotiations by the EU but unlike the ACP states its exports were subjected to a 
different set of rules.375 The EU was concerned that if South Africa was treated 
similarly to the BLNS countries, such treatment had the potential to inhibit market 
access and tariff liberalisation achieved under the TDCA.376  
                                                          
369 Rob Davis’ statement  in ‘European commissioner for trade Karel De Gucht criticises SA over 
unilateral decision to cut bilateral investment treaties with some EU member states’ 2013 available at 
www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=17354&GroupID=3.  
370 M Pant op cit. 
371 TDCA op cit Article 52.  
372 Ibid Article 53. 
373 Albert Makochekanwa ‘SACU (RUN-AWAY) Trade Agenda: Challenges and Threats to the SADC 
Regional Integration Project’ Trades & Development Studies Centre-Trust [Trades Centre]. 
374 Mmegi Online Gaborone in News op cit. 





When the 2008 time frame to conclude the EPA negotiations failed, it led to 
confusion within the seven members of SADC. There were already controversial 
issues on which the members could not agree on within the IEPAs and South Africa 
objected when the EU proposed the inclusion of the Singapore Issues.377 These are 
the issues that were introduced to the WTO agenda at a Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore and they are competition policy, investment, transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation, with the first three being excluded from the Doha 
agenda.378 The objection was based on that the concessions on agriculture which 
would help developing countries had not been discussed and yet the developed 
countries sought to discuss issues that were of more importance to them.379 
South Africa is the main trading partner for all SADC members and it therefore 
plays a very dominant role. The EU’s pressure following the failure to conclude the 
negotiations rendered it more difficult to reconcile the TDCA and the EPAs.380 
4.3 DO THE TDCA OBJECTIVES FACILITATE OR HINDER MARKET ACCESS 
AND INTEGRATION? 
 The Agreement has had a forceful impact in terms of increasing competition 
for both imports and exports.381 Furthermore, it has the potential to reduce SACU’s 
revenue accrual directly from tariff reductions and when tariffs are reduced, the 
BLNS states lose revenue as a result of the CET that applied to the EU and was 
removed by the agreement.382 This emanates from the fact that the BLNS countries 
are de-facto part of the TDCA since under SACU a member is not allowed to enter 
into an agreement with any other third country without the consent of the other 
members383 and the BLNS are themselves members of SACU. The common 
revenue pool funds are distributed in a way that the smaller countries within SACU 
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receive a larger share, therefore when tariffs fall these states are the ones that will 
be affected more negatively.384 
 It is also worth mentioning that the BLNS countries are obligated to liberalise 
a high percentage of their products and this results in the countries losing huge 
revenue.385 The TDCA has the potential to divert both imports and exports of South 
Africa further away from the BLNS states into the EU and this would result in the 
countries having to compete on both sides with the EU. 
 There is a relatively fair percentage of goods that South Africa imports from 
the EU and because of the free movement of goods within SACU, these imports 
have a high chance of landing in the BLNS states.386 This is disadvantageous on 
these states because it may be extremely difficult for them to come up with trade 
policies independently considering how dominant South Africa is and how limited 
their power is in tariff policies.387 This will lead to the domestic industries of these 
countries having to compete with the lower import prices from the EU and another 
possibility is that the enlarged market of goods from the industrialised European 
nations has the potential to de-industrialise the BLNS states.388 
The TDCA was signed between the EU and South Africa, however it is 
applicable on imported goods that come from the EU into the BLNS territories due to 
them being in a CU with South Africa which is also a result of the de facto 
application. 389 The South African economy has transformed and South Africa has 
become a state that attracts foreign investment due to its internal market developing 
and thereby allowing players from outside to bring in a different standard of 
development prospects390 and in this manner the agreement is helping develop the 
economy of South Africa. 
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The TDCA and SACU are based on rules and were regarded as building 
blocks to the generation of new arrangements that will be introduced by the EPAs 
until insufficient attention was given to institutional and legal aspects and they 
somewhat transformed into stumbling blocks.391  
4.4 SADC EPA 
South Africa is engaged in negotiations on the regional EPA with the EU as 
part of the SADC EPA group.392 
4.4.1 Position of the negotiations  
The EU requested SACU to come up with a new offer on agricultural market 
access by the 18 and latest 21 June at the negotiating round that was held in 
Brussels.393 It is important to highlight that SACU’s participation in the EU EPA 
negotiations through the SADC configuration stems from the fact that all SACU 
members belong to SADC.394 The CU came up with that new offer but the EU 
considered it insufficient when matched with the market access that the EU has 
opened for its Southern African trading partners.395 As agricultural products are of a 
crucial and sensitive nature to the SACU countries, this has brought major concern 
in relation to the impact of further commitments.396 
Furthermore, the SADC region was also asked to review its non-agricultural 
market access as well before participating in new negotiations. In addition an 
agreement was reached that since only an agreement about goods could be reached 
before a chapter on services was drafted, the latter should be postponed.397 It also 
appears that on the subject of RoO, there has been major progress with the EU 
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reviewing a new proposal that was made by SADC regarding the cumulation and 
administrative cooperation in connection with the GSP beneficiary.398 
4.4.2 Contentious Issues 
(i) Liberalisation of all trade substantially  
Numerous contentious issues have been identified since the operation of the 
IEPAs and their variation is scattered across different regions. The EU set a policy 
which requires the states to grant it duty-free access on at least 80 per cent of their 
products within a period of 15 years.399 It is said that many RECs demand an 
interpretation and implementation that is flexible enough to accommodate for weaker 
economies as they consider the EU’s interpretation of the requirement 
unreasonable.400  
(ii) Restrictions on exports: abolition 
The implementation of the full EPAs is going to result in restrictions on 
exported taxes being abolished.401 The exports have so far brought down the prices 
of important commodities (agricultural commodities). The EU has requested that they 
be eliminated and prohibited from being used in the future.402 African countries have 
argued that they be maintained since they assist in gains of revenue and allow 
countries to protect their infant industries from competition through export duties.403 
The EU prohibited the increase of export restrictions and the decision to 
abolish them will also deprive the states from having the value creation of many of 
their products promoted effectively.404 The SADC states opposed this prohibition and 
consulted with the EU and in doing so they had to provide justification for the 
maintenance of the export restriction.405 
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(iii) The MFN Clause  
The inclusion of the MFN clause that was incorporated in the IEPAs requires 
the signatory states that grant preferences to third countries in agreements they 
have with those parties separate from the IEPAs to grant same to the EU.406 This is 
in essence provided for as thus; SADC states ought to grant the EC the same 
favourable treatment that is applied as a result of the state or states forming a free 
trade agreement with other major trading partners post signing the Agreement.407  
With emerging players such as the BRICs, the EU is taking precautions to 
guard against replacement as Africa’s most important trading partner. This clause 
also ensures that the IEPA African states’ scope of action to protect their markets is 
inhibited.408 Some members of SADC have voiced that this clause would limit their 
policy space and that it is not WTO compliant in relation to WTO rules that govern 
FTAs.409 It should be noted that the MFN clause as it stands would only apply to 
FTAs that are concluded with third parties.410 
(iv) Rules of Origin 
The RoO had to be extended due to the fact that only a few products in this 
current era are manufactured entirely in one country. They exist as a deterrent on 
third countries moving their products to countries that enjoy duty free access in the 
EU market.411 The accumulation method which is a segment of the extension that 
allows the ACP states’ attribution to the origin of the product and subsequent benefit 
by that state from improved market access although the countries may have 
contributed only a very small portion in production was developed.412 The EPA 
negotiations have however weakened this possibility. 
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(v) The Standstill Clause/Modification of Tariff Schedules 
Since the majority of the states have set low tariffs and there is need to freeze 
all products at the level that is currently applied, the states’ re-scope is restricted.413 
It is said that upon the implementation of the standstill clause, the SADC states 
requested for its application to be only on products that are liberalised.414 It is 
important to mention that this clause prohibits tariffs increase to a level that is higher 
than the one that the SADC IEPA members and the EU have agreed on.415 From this 
an inference can be made that the CU will have to consider the tariff lines that the 
EPA states have agreed upon. 
It is possible that the SADC members will be inhibited when they choose 
which CET to form still ensuring that it remains compatible with GATT obligations 
because of the standstill clause. However, because GATT has no prohibitions on 
parties raising their tariffs when they form a CU, the clause cannot prevent the 
application of a CET that is above the SADC EPA agreed tariffs.416 
4.4.3 Progress  
Ever since it was implemented, the TDCA has brought progressive trade 
trends and contributed massively towards restructuring the economy of South Africa 
as well as securing preferential market access for its products.417 In addition it has 
consolidated the strategic links with the economies of the EU membership.418 There 
is a review clause that has been entrenched in the TDCA and which South Africa 
found appropriate as it coincided with the EPA negotiations launch to be used in 
order to review the TDCA trade chapter.419 These negotiations are considered to be 
an opportunity to consolidate SACU vis-à-vis the EU. 
South Africa gave in to the EU’s invitation to negotiate a deal on geographical 
indications (GIs) and this deal is aimed at establishing an internationally binding 
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agreement which will not protect only EU wines and spirits names but also names of 
agricultural products.420 
4.4.4 EU-SADC EPA’s relation to the TDCA 
 It was mentioned in the preceding chapters that the CPA introduced a new 
trade regime that would be compatible with WTO rules and that was in the form of 
the EU-ACP EPAs.421 These agreements have their main principles as 
differentiation, reciprocity, deeper regional integration and coordination of trade and 
aid.422 South Africa, Namibia and Zambia are the only countries in the SADC-EPA 
group that have not signed the IEPA. 
South Africa has not signed because it is of the view that the areas dealing 
with RoO, tariff negotiations and other outstanding contentious issues still have to be 
addressed before it can sign the agreement. The country already has market access 
under the TDCA but it is obstinate in its quest for more improved market access 
under the SADC EPA.423 The EU pointed out that if it is to grant South Africa its 
request, South Africa will have to reciprocate on those products that are currently not 
included in the TDCA offer.424 South Africa is reluctant as such and it does not seem 
likely that it will end up signing the agreement as again it will be subjected to different 
and less favourable rules compared to the other SADC members. 
On the issue of RoO, South Africa is concerned because the issues dealing 
with cumulation and RoO in relation to fish have not been solved yet. Intellectual 
property issues (and emphasis ought to be made on GI in this respect), cooperation 
on matters relating to tax and sustainable development are also things that need to 
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4.5 CAN SACU WITHSTAND THE CO-EXISTENCE OF THE TDCA AND THE 
SADC EPA? 
 Many issues have been addressed but SACU members still have to agree on 
a number of things such as market access for South Africa. The EU and South 
Africa’s market access directly impacts the economies of Botswana and Namibia and 
the two countries are particularly worried about this situation426 in addition to the 
issue of agricultural safeguard measures. South Africa has also made concessions 
under the TDCA regarding these measures and the members are concerned that 
there is a possibility for a conflict of interests to ensue.427 
 The Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry questioned how the 
member states were supposed to be guaranteed that the EU would compete in a fair 
manner with Namibian products that had no subsidy.428 They are of the view that if 
the TDCA is not properly managed, local industries of both Botswana and Namibia 
are going to be adversely affected when imported agricultural goods to South Africa 
from the EU are in competition with indigenous agricultural goods in those two 
countries.429 
The members are worried that the full implementation of the TDCA wherein 
the EU market opens up 80-something per cent of South African goods and South 
Africa opens its market to about 90-something per cent of goods from the EU is 
going to affect them.430  
Regardless of what the outcome will be, the two members have to take note 
of the 2014 deadline because should they fail to meet it the EU is going to remove 
them from the list of states which will be granted market access from 2014431 and 
this would be even more disadvantageous to the two states as they would then only 
conduct their trade with the EU under the GSP which does not have a 
comprehensive coverage like the EPAs and more importantly Namibia’s important 
exports are not included in the GSP. 
                                                          










4.5.1 Implications of SACU vis-à-vis SADC EPA 
 The BLNS states can opt for a consolidation within SACU behind South Africa 
and the TDCA or for South Africa and the BLNS to proceed on parallel pathways. 
Some scholars are of the view that SACU should push for a CU to CU bilateral deal 
with the EU and forego the EU-EPA.432  
 According to data and statistics collected by economists, Lesotho and 
Swaziland have their governments’ revenue coming in from SACU and this means 
that the policies that can affect the revenue of SACU are imperative for these states 
to achieve economic development. 
When studies are conducted on the results of SACU engaging in a full 
reciprocal liberalisation with the EU without South Africa in which sensitive products 
that require protection are not classified and in another instance SACU engaging in 
the same with both the EU and South Africa,433 it is discovered that South Africa 
gains significantly when it is excluded from the full reciprocal liberalisation than it 
does if it is included and the EU gains enormously when South Africa is included and 
so does the rest of SACU while the reverse is quite contrary.434 
4.5.2 Implications of the TDCA and SADC EPA on the SACU CET 
 When the TDCA was implemented, it was discovered that there were 
sensitivities that were identified with 53 tariff lines and were not accommodated by 
the EU.435 The BLNS states stated that they would align themselves to the TDCA 
provisions with South Africa if those sensitive products could be accommodated. The 
request of the BLNS countries was accepted by the EC and included in Annex 3 of 
the SADC EPA group IEPA.436 There was an agreement that they would be fully 
liberalised by 2015.437 South Africa unfortunately did not initial the IEPA and as a 
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result the tariff inconsistencies still exist between the IEPA and TDCA with regards to 
those tariff lines. 
 It is said that aligning the tariff lines that are applied in South Africa for EU 
exports to the ones applied by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to the same EU 
products would be a way of ensuring that the SACU external tariff maintains its 
uniformity and that the amendment of the TDCA would be the best way to preserve 
the CU’s tariff coherence as well as the quickest way to continue the full SADC EPA 
talks.438 
4.5.3 Repercussions for failure to conclude the SADC EPA 
 The economies of many SADC countries have been sustained and held 
together by the EU having granted preferential market access to these countries.  
The SADC EPA negotiations have been on-going following the signing of the 
IEPA in 2007 to allow for the smooth flow of trade. The EU is currently strict in 
pushing for the full EPA agreement to be signed and SADC EPA members will face 
loss of preferential market access to the EU should they fail to finalise the agreement 
before the IEPA expires in 2014.439 The EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht 
indicated that the Agreement should be ratified by October 2014.440 For example, the 
Commissioner stated that exports from Botswana into the EU would face a possibility 
of having to experience application of duties and quotas upon their entry if an 
agreement was not reached.441 
The challenges are a result of the negotiations on the EPAs which are meant 
to be concluded on a regional basis still being bogged down because there are 
technical issues that still need to be solved. 
It is emphasised that if the trade talks fail, the majority of the African countries 
are going to have limited preferential access to the EU markets or no preference at 
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all.442 The dangers of serious trade disruption have high chances of influencing 
countries to engage in individual trade deals with the EU thereby splitting from their 
respective regional groupings.443 If the countries found themselves in this kind of 
situation, the CU having common trade policies would end their regional economic 
integration processes. This is particularly so with regards to Botswana and Namibia 
which have pledged regional unity but this can change and tensions will rise if the 
agreement is not signed.444 
The European Commission has to take note that if the regional groupings in 
Africa split, the impact would be negative and would cause long lasting political and 
economic repercussions. 
4.6 BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM THE TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 
 The tripartite arrangement of COMESA, EAC and SADC is said to provide the 
foundation of the Continental Free Trade Area which is promoted by the African 
Union (AU) Commission, and its partners.445 The three RECs decided to launch this 
initiative because they mainly wanted to remove the inconsistencies and costs which 
are currently in existence in regional integration and are brought about through 
overlapping memberships.446 
 The drawbacks of the RECs coming together were highlighted previously. The 
TFTA will hold benefits that will accrue as a result of its member states belonging to 
more than one REC. This section therefore details solutions to the overlapping 
membership problem that was discussed in chapter three.  
The states have an opportunity to achieve economies of scale and the 
different regions will be in a position to compete globally through the development of 
a large internal market.447 Moreover, the tripartite strategy entails implementing the 
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TFTA, trade and transport infrastructure projects as well as free movement of 
business persons across the involved RECs.448 This diversifies trade and deepens 
integration within the continent. 
 Furthermore the tripartite states account for half of the AU’s membership. This 
means that they have a high GDP combined. The TFT Area is considered to build on 
the FTAs that already exist in the three RECs.449 In coming together the states will 
have to engage in negotiations and the fact that there are Preferential Trade Areas 
(PTAs) and FTA trading arrangements already in existence in those regions, not all 
the states will have to negotiate with each other450 and this in essence decreases the 
chances of having too many conflicts. 
4.6.1 IMPLEMENTATION: WAY FORWARD 
The strategy that has been set up in order to implement the TFTA is 
underway and the states are taking all efforts to complete negotiations within the 
time they have set for themselves in the roadmap451 (36 months).452 The Tripartite 
Summit adopted a proposal in which states that belong to a FTA ought to extend the 
preferences to members of their own regional FTA and then to members that belong 
to other regional FTAs.  
For example, COMESA members should device the COMESA FTA and offer 
non-COMESA FTA members the same preferences on a reciprocal basis as they 
offer actual members453 and the same will be expected of the SADC and EAC. 
Members of COMESA who are non-SADC members together with EAC members 
will also have to offer SACU members duty and quota free market access on a 
reciprocal basis.454 
4.6.2 South Africa as a proxy for SACU 
The growth and regional integration of Africa has to be at the forefront, 
however regarding South Africa and its external trade policy as SACU cuts its trade 
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barriers to non-African states, African states are somewhat at a disadvantage and 
the progress of integration is slowed down. African trade partners would be a priority 
hence speed up regional integration if the SADC CU was to adopt a SACU CET that 
is slightly modified. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
It was mentioned earlier that the EU has decided that it will terminate duty and 
quota free access to the EU market by 1 October 2014 for those states that will have 
not concluded the full EPAs. This is of special concern because there is too much 
technical and policy work that still has to be done and the deadline pressurises the 
states unnecessarily, in particular the SADC EPA group since they would lose 
remarkably if preferential access to the EU markets was to be withdrawn. 
A significant quantity and amount of goods that are imported into South Africa 
are from the EU and the BLNS states are attached to the TDCA due to the imports 
being freely transferred through SACU. There are products that are not almost duty 
free but for the BLNS states it is almost impossible to formulate sensible industrial 
policies because with South Africa dominating, the states are less independent in 
implementing tariff policies and this ultimately falls back to the issue of the 
mentioned states’ revenues. 
The TFTA will reduce trading costs for and within the three RECs. The RECs 
will have to harmonise their policies and in terms of SADC and SACU, it would be 
ideal if SACU expanded to accommodate the rest of the SADC members who are 
currently not SACU members however difficult this may turn out to be considering 
how complex and deeply integrated the SACU agreement is. 
The SADC EPAs and the TDCA differ in that the EPAs are agreements meant 
to help in the development of the ACP states  while the TDCA is an agreement with 
South Africa which is a country viewed as capable of international market 
competition. The SADC EPAs are therefore more favourable than the TDCA is. The 
pressure that the EU is exerting on the states with the states ultimately being off the 
list of states which will be enjoying preferential treatment come October 2014 if they 
have not concluded the full EPAs is going to have a negative effect on how the 




afford to lose the kind of preferential treatment from the EU that is offered in the 
EPAs. Despite this, all exports to the EU from the BLNS states except for sugar from 
























                                                          






Regional economic integration has been what most of SACU and SADC 
member states have aimed for. SADC sought to alleviate poverty in the region and 
by liberalising tariffs it has increased the chances of investment allowing for 
international competitiveness. Having its own RoO, goods originating from its 
member states have an advantage in the other members’ markets.   
Although market integration is what is sought after, SADC is still an FTA and 
will have to overcome many challenges to succeed in market integration. The merger 
between COMESA, EAC and SADC promises to help improve integration, however 
the lack of diligent implementation of mechanisms that ensure member states’ 
compliance has to be given great consideration. This merger will also solve what 
appears to be the problem at the core of these states succeeding in regional market 
integration which is the fact that not one state belongs to just a single REC, and this 
renders them incapable of meeting their commitments under the multiple RECs.  
SACU aims to promote industrialisation and facilitate trade and in doing so, it 
has taken steps to identify key barriers to trade with the assistance of the World 
Bank. 
South Africa and the EU share a vision in which they have undertaken to 
promote economic integration so that they can contribute to the Southern Africa 
region’s sustainable economic development under Article 1(c) of the TDCA. Policies 
are yet to be aligned and the effectiveness of the efforts made to harmonise these 
policies and the achievement of a solid regional market growth in an effort to attain 
deeper integration is what will improve SACU’s performance. 
SACU/SADC countries have evolved in trade due to the relationship with the 
EU and due to the fact that they are being recognised as growing states which are 
capable of trading internationally and participating as ‘equal’ partners in Agreements 
such as the CPA with the developed countries because of reciprocity. The 
negotiations of SADC EPA aim to enforce a trade relationship of equals among its 




through the SADC EPA the signatories of this Agreement will also have an 
opportunity to grow their economies globally. 
Looking at how South Africa has progressed under the TDCA, it remains to be 
seen whether the country will change or negotiate any amendments that will be 
beneficial via de facto application to the BLNS under the TDCA. Studies have shown 
that when this happens South Africa falls on the losing end. In respect of the SADC 
EPA, the EU is willing to open its market for South African sugar at a certain quota 
as well as expand duty free quota for wine at a certain quantity. As the deadline 
approaches, it will be seen what the African states decide. It should however be 
borne in mind that it does not  appear as though the TDCA and SADC EPA will be 
aligned considering the position South Africa would be in when both Agreements are 
compared in respect of the country. 
The SADC states have indeed benefited from preferential treatments but 
there are concepts that are going to be problematic on trade liberalisation regarding 
these states. For South Africa, the MFN clause restricts it when dealing with its new 
partners such as the BRIC and for all the other SADC EPA members and non-
member South Africa inclusive, inhibits the scope of protection for their markets. The 
Modification of Tariff Schedules makes it impossible for the members to increase 
tariffs to a level higher than what is contained in the Agreement. This would inhibit 
members as compatibility with GATT provisions would have to be upheld when 
forming a CET but GATT does not prohibit the increase of tariffs when a CU is 
formed. 
When SADC EPA is implemented, abolition of restrictions on exports is going 
to affect the members negatively because they will not be able to protect their infant 
industries from competition coming from other regions nationally and internationally 
through export duties. 
States enjoying membership in more than one REC is the root problem in 
regional market integration and for the COMESA, EAC and SADC their formation of 
a TFTA is more likely going to assist in the resolution of the issues these RECs will 




Under the TDCA there are products that are not almost duty free, but for the 
BLNS states it is extremely difficult to formulate sensible industrial policies because 
with South Africa dominating, the states are less independent in implementing tariff 
policies. The SADC EPA group is unnecessarily under pressure with the time limit 
the EU has set in place and also due to extreme technical and policy work that is still 
underway. This causes distress because these members stand to be disadvantaged 
remarkably if preferential access to the EU markets was to be withdrawn. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The TDCA and SADC IEPA provisions on RoO and tariffs should be aligned 
and the issues relating to the MFN should also be sorted if the member stats are to 
attain a complete EPA that will boost regional market integration within SACU/SADC. 
Issues that deal with trade competition and trade facilitation ought to be prioritised 
and included as SACU/SADC integration objectives. 
It would also improve SACU integration if transaction costs were to be 
reduced and SACU members had increased opportunities within the region and the 
EU. Funded EU projects should provide the SADC region with technical and financial 
assistance as this would facilitate the implementation of the SADC EPA. As another 
way of improving market integration, regional trade in services should be expanded 
and investment within the region and the EU ought to be promoted.  
Furthermore, the SADC EPA should be formulated in a way that encourages 
the building of common positions and the alliance of regional rules on matters 
dealing with trade facilitation among other things. The Agreement should also boost 
and ensure that the implementation of commitments in regional trade in goods is 
effective. 
5.3 WAY FORWARD  
If SACU/SADC would opt for a marginally modified CET and then form a CU 
with the rest of SADC, some of the problems that this region is likely to encounter 
when it merges with COMESA and the EAC would be reduced. States should be 
obliged to comply and carry out their objectives and obligations as undertaken if 




engaging in conduct that is adverse to the smaller players knowing the latter will not 
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